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INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years ago, the Supreme Court issued its unanimous opinion in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 1 Authored by
Justice Stevens, the decision was concise and circumspect, and the relatively
easy facts of that case should have limited its reach. Certainly, the Court could
not have foreseen that Chevron would be declared a watershed case.2 Yet in
retrospect, the decision took hold as one of the most controversial in the history
of administrative law.3
A quarter-century later, Justice Stevens must rue the day he penned the
concise words of Chevron's central holding. 4 Indeed, after many years of
stretching the Court's decision well beyond its original bounds, a shifting
majority of the Court appears to be backpedaling in a sporadic effort to devise a
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in
ADMINISTRATIvE LAW STORIES 399, 420-421 (Peter L. Strauss ed. 2006) (observing lack of evidence
that any of the justices at the time considered Chevron "some kind of watershed decision"); see also
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 589 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to Chevron as
"our watershed decision").
3. Merrill, supra note 2, at 400.
4. See William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1088 (2008)
(noting the "doctrinal tug-of-war" since 1987 between Justices Stevens and Scalia that came to a
head in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)); see also Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159,
1170 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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more balanced, nuanced deference framework. 5
Beginning in 2000, the Rehnquist Court began sketching out the parameters
of a more flexible, multi-factor approach to determine the nature and degree of
judicial deference warranted for agency interpretations. 6 In doing so, the Court
followed a discernable pattern of retrenchment from the unwittingly simplistic
approach mapped out in Chevron. In a series of decisions, the Rehnquist Court
chipped away at Chevron's sweeping "domain," 7 generally confining its
doctrine of heightened deference to regulations adopted in notice-and-comment
rulemaking.8
The most controversial of these was United States v. Mead Corp.,9 decided in
2001. The Mead Court breathed new life into Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 10 a 1944
decision predating the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Skidmore had
articulated a multifaceted common law deference framework depending upon
various enumerated factors the Court credited as lending persuasive value to
agency interpretations. 11 While Mead expressly revived the more flexible
common law deference doctrine, it failed to reconcile Skidmore with the
superseding provisions of the APA governing judicial review. 12
By the end of Chief Justice Rehnquist's last term, the Court had settled into
a relatively predictable dichotomy. The Court generally applied Chevron
deference if a rule had been adopted in notice-and-comment proceedings, and
otherwise defaulted to classic Skidmore analysis of various persuasive factors to
determine whether a less formal agency interpretation warranted deference. In
its final term, the Rehnquist Court resolved a complex issue concerning the
stare decisis effect on agencies of judicial precedents interpreting black-letter
law. In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services,13
the Court held that an agency is bound by a court's prior interpretation of a
statute or rule only if the court declared its language unambiguous. 14 In that
5. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 236-37 (8-1 decision).
Although we all accept the position that the Judiciary should defer to at least some of
this multifarious administrative action, we have to decide how to take account of the
great range of its variety. . . The Court's choice has been to tailor deference to
variety .... This acceptance of the range of statutory variation has led the Court to
recognize more than one variety of judicial deference ....
Id. (footnotes omitted).
6. See Christensen, 529 U.S. 576 (6-3 opinion).
7. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 835 (2001).
Some scholars have referred picturesquely to the trend as "cabining Chevron." See, e.g., Cass R.
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 193 (2006).
8. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230.
9. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
10. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
11. Id. at 140; see infra note 100 and accompanying text.
12. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). Justice Souter, writing for the majority, occasionally cited relevant
APA provisions in his opinion, but only in passing. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227, 228 n.6, 229.
13. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
14. Id. at 982-83.
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event, the prior judicial interpretation controls over any subsequent agency
interpretation to the contrary. 15
Nevertheless, the Rehnquist Court failed to reconcile its generally narrower
deference framework with the Court's sweepingly deferential 1997 holding in
Auer v. Robbins.16 Authored by Justice Scalia for a unanimous Court, Auer held
that an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation was entitled to
particularly deferential respect. 17 Moreover, the Court rejected an argument
that agencies should apply canons of statutory construction to resolve apparent
ambiguities in their own regulations. 18
While its legacy was a relatively stable yet more complex deference
doctrine, the Rehnquist Court essentially disregarded the APA's language
governing judicial review. 19 If the Court was unable to resolve an ambiguity in
a statute Congress had delegated authority to an agency to administer, the
Court applied one of three common law deference frameworks: Chevron if the
agency had interpreted an ambiguous statute by adopting regulations in notice-
and-comment proceedings, Mead/Skidmore if the agency had issued its
interpretation of an ambiguous statute by informal means such as letter rulings
or policy statements, and Auer if the agency had interpreted its own ambiguous
regulation by whatever means. 20 What remained was for the Court to reconcile
Auer deference with the less deferential Skidmore doctrine revived by Mead.
Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr. took up the Court's reins in October 2005.
Less than four months later, in Gonzales v. Oregon,21 Roberts joined his first
dissenting opinion. 22 The 6-3 majority further narrowed Chevron's reach by
refusing to defer to Attorney General John Ashcroft's interpretive ruling 23 that
sought to unilaterally preempt Oregon's Death with Dignity Act. 24 Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, reasoned that Auer deference did not apply
because Ashcroft's "interpretive" ruling had merely "parroted" the relevant
statutory language rather than interpreting an ambiguous regulation.25 Nor
could Ashcroft invoke Chevron deference because the Controlled Substances Act
did not authorize him to unilaterally issue interpretive rules having the force of
15. Id. at 982.
16. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
17. Id. at 461. Auer deferred to the Department of Labor's amicus brief interpreting an
ambiguous agency regulation. Id.
18. Id. at 462-63.
19. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (providing that "the reviewing court shall decide all questions of
law, interpret... statutory provisions, and determine the meaning... of an agency [rule)). See infra
notes 127-131 and accompanying text.
20. An agency's interpretation of its own regulation would surely take shape in a medium less
formal than notice-and-comment rulemaking. Thus, it is difficult to square Auer's super-deference
with the Court's revival of Skidmore for interpretations embodied in policy statements, guidelines,
litigation documents, letter rulings, and the like.
21. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
22. Id. at 275 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J. & Thomas, J.).
23. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607, 56,608 (Nov. 9,
2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1306).
24. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.995 (2006).
25. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 258; see id. at 256-57 (distinguishing Auer, 519 U.S. at 461-63).
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law. 26
During its first four terms, the Roberts Court has been anything but
consistent in resolving administrative deference issues.27 A recent empirical
study identified no fewer than seven distinct "deference regimes" the Court has
applied since it decided Chevron.28 The Roberts Court has drawn unevenly and
unpredictably upon each of these approaches, and its reasoning often varies
depending on which justice writes the opinion 29 and which justices vote with
the majority and thus influence the Court's reasoning. 30 Nearly a decade after
the Rehnquist Court began to narrow Chevron's reach, the unfortunate result is
a mish-mash of a muddled mess. 31 And so far, the Roberts Court has done very
little to straighten it out.
Rather than continuing the pretense that Chevron remains the presumptive
default rule, 32 the Roberts Court should reconcile its multiple common law
deference doctrines by expressly articulating and systematically applying an
integrated approach incorporating the multi-factor standard revived by the
Rehnquist Court.33 While Chevron did not expressly invoke the multivariate
deference standard rooted in Skidmore, the Court surely would have reached the
same result had it applied that analysis. Without doubt, the factors articulated
in Chevron favoring the agency's interpretation of the controlling statute were
highly persuasive, even under the Skidmore analysis. The sweepingly broad
influence Chevron enjoyed during its heyday may have had more to do with the
political influence of the Reagan administration and the scholars who
championed the decision as revolutionizing administrative law.3
4
While Chevron may not be a dead letter,35 its twenty-five year reign is
26. Id. at 268.
27. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 4, at 1098 (concluding that the Court is "wildly inconsistent"
in applying administrative deference doctrines); cf. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In
Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1237 (2007) (noting that "the scope
of Skidmore's applicability in the post-Mead era is still unclear").
28. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 4, at 1098-117.
29. The assignment is made by the Chief Justice if he votes with the majority, or otherwise by
the senior justice voting with the majority. See, e.g., Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and Constraints on
Supreme Court Opinion Assignment, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1729, 1731 (2006).
30. See id. at 1733-34 (explaining the assigned author's strategic advantage).
31. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1464 (2005), cited in Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129
S. Ct. 2458, 2480 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Eskridge &
Baer, supra note 4, at 1157 ("In short, the Supreme Court's deference jurisprudence is a mess."); Ann
Graham, Searching for Chevron in Muddy Watters: The Roberts Court and Judicial Review of Agency
Regulations, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 229, 262 (2008) (referring to "a confusing muddle of decisions which
turn on internecine disputes, backfilling from the desired result, and flavor-of-the-week analytical
models").
32. See Einer Elhauge, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: How TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION
79-80 (2008).
33. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001).
34. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr et al., Judicial Review of Agency Action in a Conservative Era, 39
ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 372 (1987) (quoting panelist Richard K. Willard, then Assistant Attorney
General, who referred to Chevron as "a helpful way of corralling the open-ended judicial arrogance
that is so richly characterized by the D.C. Circuit's jurisprudence for the past 20 or 30 years").
35. But see Graham, supra note 31, at 239 ("Classic Chevron analysis is dead.").
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drawing to a close36 -and rightly so. It remains to be seen whether federal
courts applying the post-Chevron deference framework 37 will strike the proper
balance, yielding an adequate margin of interpretive discretion to agencies
while also imposing sufficient constraints on maverick officials who would
otherwise strain the limits of delegated rulemaking authority. Without doubt,
federal courts and administrative officials alike need clearer guidance on the
appropriate scope of judicial review as well as the factors that influence courts
to defer to agency interpretations. 38
This article attempts to assimilate and synthesize the evolution of the
Court's post-Chevron deference doctrine over the last decade, reconcile the
principal common law deference regimes with the relevant provisions of the
APA, and offer suggestions on how to ameliorate confusion among courts,
agencies, and Congress regarding how the Court applies common law
deference doctrines to agency interpretations of law.
To provide temporal context for the Court's increasingly disjointed
deference jurisprudence and some of its missing links, Parts I and II offer an
historical overview. Part I begins with the origins of administrative law in the
late nineteenth century and discusses the common law deference doctrines that
developed during and after the New Deal, culminating with Chevron in 1984.
Part II analyzes the Court's administrative deference jurisprudence during
Chevron's heyday from 1984 until 2000.
Part III seeks to reconcile and synthesize the Supreme Court's judicial
deference decisions since the turn of the twenty-first century, beginning with a
brief discussion of Auer,39 representing the apex of the Rehnquist Court's
attitude of deference to agency interpretations. Part III continues by discussing
the Rehnquist Court's decision in Christensen v. Harris County,40 as later refined
by Mead.4 1 It concludes with a summary of the primary common law deference
doctrines as they had evolved by the close of the Rehnquist Court's final term.
Part IV addresses the haphazard evolution of administrative deference
jurisprudence that has characterized the Roberts Court during its first four
terms. Selected decisions illustrate that the Court's deference doctrine turns
largely on the interpretive ideology of the justices who command a majority
36. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 4, at 1098 ("[T]he Chevron regime ... plays a surprisingly
modest role in the Court's deference jurisprudence.").
37. Recent federal circuit opinions suggest an ongoing struggle to sort out and apply the
multifarious deference regimes. See Peter M. Shane, Ambiguity and Policy Making: A Cognitive
Approach to Synthesizing Chevron and Mead, 6 VILL. ENvTL. L.J. 19, 34 (2005) ("In an area of doctrine
now fraught with rhetorical confusion, some new measure of clarity would be a virtue.").
38. Id.; see also, e.g., Ohio State Univ. v. Sec'y, 996 F.2d 122, 123 n.1 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting that
the inconsistent standard of judicial deference to administrative interpretations frustrates
intermediate appellate courts); Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 316 F.3d 913, 921 (9th
Cir. 2003) ("After Mead, we are certain of only two things about the continuum of deference owed to
agency decisions: Chevron provides an example of when Chevron deference applies, and Mead
provides an example of when it does not."), vacated on reh'g en banc, 353 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2003),
amended on reh'g en banc in part, 360 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 2004).
39. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
40. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
41. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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vote in any dispute regarding agency interpretations of law.
Finally, Part V makes a few recommendations and identifies unresolved
issues that warrant further research, scholarly commentary, and congressional
action.
The Supreme Court's common law deference jurisprudence has
significantly influenced the nature and degree of judicial oversight of agency
rulemaking at all levels of the court system for more than sixty-five years.4 2 To
ensure that agency rulemaking effectively carries out its purpose, Congress
must take affirmative steps to clarify the proper role the federal courts play in
ensuring that executive branch agencies exercise rulemaking power within the
constraints of their authorizing statutes. For Congress to allow deference
jurisprudence to remain in its current muddled state raises troubling
constitutional issues regarding separation of powers 43 and the long-dormant
nondelegation doctrine. 44
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
While Chevron has been regarded as "one of the most important decisions in
the history of administrative law," 45 the Supreme Court's administrative
deference doctrine did not begin with Chevron.46 More to the point, many
aspects of what currently appears to be an "ad hoc approach" 47 can be traced to
the historical development of administrative law. 48  Thus, a complete
understanding of the significance of Chevron and its successors requires an
appreciation of its historical context,49 including the various judicial deference
doctrines that ebbed and flowed during most of the twentieth century.
A. The Origins of Administrative Law
The middle fifty years of the twentieth century witnessed unprecedented
growth of the "headless fourth branch of government," 50 beginning with the
42. The administrative deference framework applies not only to federal agency interpretations.
Federal courts often review state agency interpretations of federal statutes governing cooperative
programs. See, e.g., Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 479 (2002)
(Medicaid); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416,420 (1977) (AFDC).
43. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
44. See infra notes 70-84 and accompanying text (discussing nondelegation doctrine).
45. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 140 (4th ed. 2002).
46. See, e.g., John H. Reese, Bursting the Chevron Bubble: Clarifying the Scope of Judicial Review in
Troubled Times, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1103, 1106-08 (2004) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984)); see also Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1170-71
(2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Judicial deference to agencies' views on statutes they administer
was not born in Chevron .... ).
47. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 4, at 1157, 1179, 1182.
48. For a concise and informative history of administrative rulemaking, see CORNELIUS M.
KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 7-21 (3d ed.
2003).
49. "The spirit of an age has a way of working its way into all the cases with which a court
deals." ALFRED G. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA 12 (1992).
50. This well-known term originated in the 1937 final report of the Committee on
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New Deal in the mid-1930's and ending with Chevron in 1984. In the early part
of the twentieth century, bench and bar, having grown comfortable with
common law jurisprudence, resisted development of the administrative state.
Both legal institutions were slow to acknowledge the increasingly important
role agencies had assumed in both litigation and lawmaking.
Administrative law originated in the industrial era of the late nineteenth
century, when political pressure compelled the federal government to
intervene. 51  Controversy resulted from expansion of the railroads and
discriminatory tariffs, and congressional initiatives to directly regulate rates
proved unworkable. 52 The cumbersome judicial process lacked sufficient
continuity to comprehensively address complex social and economic issues
associated with the railroads. 53
In 1887, the political and pragmatic need for ongoing oversight of the
railroad industry led Congress to establish the Interstate Commerce
Commission, the first federal regulatory agency. 54 In subsequent years, the
administrative state began overseeing other segments of the economy,
including banking, insurance, and communications. 55 Congress created new
administrative agencies to constrain abusive business tactics that the judicial
system was ill-equipped to control by traditional means. 56
During the economic downturn of the 1930's, administrative law's original
focus on regulation shifted to protectionism. 57 Beginning with the New Deal,
the courts began to accept the role agencies necessarily played in stabilizing the
economy and mitigating rampant unemployment.58 Nevertheless, the
Administrative Management, appointed by President Franklin Roosevelt to study the
reorganization of the executive branch. See PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., REPORT OF THE
COMMiTTEE, WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 39-41,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1937). The Committee used the term to express caution about the proliferation
of independent boards and commissions that were not directly accountable to the President. Id.
The issue remains controversial; the Roberts Court will address the political accountability of
independent agencies in its October 2009 Term. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (May 18, 2009) (No. 08-861);
see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800,1817 (2009) (plurality opinion) (referring
pointedly to the "separation-of-powers dilemma posed by the Headless Fourth Branch" and its
effect on the "unitary Executive").
51. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIvE PROCESS 7-8 (1938).
52. Id. at 9.
53. Id. at 9, 89. In particular, the judicial process was inadequate to address the rate disparities
of a national railroad system, the original impetus for establishing federal administrative agencies.
Id. at 125.
54. See id. at 10, 89.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 14.
57. See id. at 12-16. "The dominant theme in the administrative structure is ... concern for an
industry whose economic health has become a responsibility of government." Id. at 12; see AMAN,
supra note 49, at 12-13.
58. See AMAN, supra note 49, at 8 (noting that the courts' "hands-off approach" during and after
the New Deal "facilitated agency change and the evolutionary growth of the administrative state");
LANDIS, supra note 51, at 14-15 (observing that after the 1929 stock market crash, "a perplexed state
relied almost exclusively upon the administrative approach to its many and staggering problems").
Eighty years later, the dramatic economic downturn in 2008-09 and associated political events are
stunning reminders of the political pressure on the federal government to intervene when market
2010]
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unfamiliar remedial process of the administrative state met with continued
opposition and suspicion from the legal profession. 
59
In 1938, responding to the Attorney General's request, President Roosevelt
appointed a committee of "eminent lawyers, jurists, scholars and
administrators," 60 later known as the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure. 61 The Committee engaged in a comprehensive two-
year investigation of government agencies. Its final report was later declared "a
landmark in the field of administrative law." 6
2
The reliance on government expertise was a natural outgrowth of the rise of
the administrative state during the New Deal. 63 In large part, the philosophical
justification for the civil service system, designed to foster political
independence and agency expertise, rested on the shared social value of
allowing agency officials flexibility and discretion to carry out their
responsibilities. 64 Agency expertise was considered a natural extension of the
authority granted to elected representatives, who were thought to have more
expertise than average voters regarding social and economic policy. 65 From
this perspective, the expertise and independence entrusted to agency officials
reflected the political values characteristic of representative democracy.66
Judicial respect for the specialized expertise of government agencies would
soon become a primary principle underpinning early deference doctrines.
67
Indeed, federal courts continue to cite agency expertise as one of the primary
factors justifying deference to administrative interpretations of law.68 As we
will see, the deference doctrines that developed as a matter of practical
necessity during the New Deal would continue to wield influence for many
years to come. 69
forces fail.
59. See PIERCE, supra note 45, at 12-15; Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50
HARV. L. REV. 5, 16-18 (1936).
60. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIvE PROCEDURE
ACT 5 (1947) [hereinafter APA MANUAL].
61. Id.
62. APA MANUAL, supra note 60, at 5. The report was the primary source of recommendations
later incorporated in the APA. Id. The Supreme Court recently cited the APA MANUAL,
acknowledging its continuing persuasive value. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696,1704 (2009).
63. See AMAN, supra note 49, at 22.
64. GARY C. BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION: LAW AND POLICY IN FEDERAL REGULATORY
AGENCIES 5 (1987).
65. See AMAN, supra note 49, at 15-16. "This willingness to defer to 'experts' after the Great
Depression was an understandable, very American approach to complex problems." Id. at 16. The
Bush and Obama Administrations' bold responses to the current economic crisis, backed by
Congress, underscore the longstanding American tradition of deference to administrative agencies
during troubled times.
66. Id.
67. LANDIS, supra note 51, at 150; see GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES 21 (1982) ("[D]elegation of authority to administrative agencies was the paradigmatic
New Deal response to the danger of legal petrification.").
68. See infra notes 98, 220, 333-34, 378, 492, 539, & 693 and accompanying text.
69. AMAN, supra note 49, at 24.
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B. The Nondelegation Doctrine
As early as 1825, the United States Supreme Court articulated what would
later be known as the nondelegation doctrine, 70 a corollary to the constitutional
principle of separation of powers. Under traditional nondelegation doctrine,
"Congress may not constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another
branch of [g]ovemment." 71 The Constitution nevertheless permits Congress to
"seek assistance" from coordinate branches as long as they operate within
properly defined limits known as "intelligible principles." 72
The nondelegation doctrine has obvious implications for administrative
rulemaking, which always depends on a congressional grant of authority,
whether express or implied. 73 Only twice, however, has the Supreme Court
relied on the nondelegation doctrine to strike down legislation. 74  Both
decisions invalidated parts of the National Industrial Recovery Act, by all
accounts unusually broad-sweeping legislation. 75 But never again has the
Court invalidated legislation on nondelegation principles. 76
Some observers have gone so far as to declare the nondelegation doctrine
dead.77 Others consider it "on life support, with the Supreme Court neither
willing to pull the plug nor prepared to revive it." 78 Still others have reasoned
that the nondelegation doctrine cannot be defended based on constitutional
analysis. 79
While the nondelegation doctrine has only rarely succeeded as a
70. Two scholars recently coined the arguably more descriptive term "delegation non-
doctrine." Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Delegation Really Running Riot, 93 VA. L. REV.
1035, 1036 (2007). The authors observed the proliferation of "'junior varsity' legislatures throughout
the federal government." Id.
71. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991); see U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative
powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.").
72. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); see Touby, 500 U.S. at 165
(citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)).
73. See PIERCE, supra note 45, at 306.
74. Id. at 91; see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550-51 (1935)
(striking broad delegation of power by the National Industrial Recovery Act to the President to
prescribe codes regulating nationwide trade and industry); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388,430 (1935) (striking one subsection of the Act as an unconstitutional delegation of power).
75. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 45, at 91-92.
76. AMAN, supra note 49, at 103; Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315,
318-19 (2000). In fact, the Rehnquist Court upheld a broad delegation of rulemaking power under
the Clean Air Act. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 474-76 (2001); see also
Craig N. Oren, Whitman v. American Trucking Associations- The Ghost of Delegation Revived... and
Exorcised, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 7, 8 (Peter L. Strauss ed. 2006) (noting the rarity of
judicial invocation of the nondelegation doctrine).
77. E.g., Sunstein, supra note 76, at 315 & nn. 1-3 (citing sources). But see id. at 315 (contending
that the doctrine is alive and well); see also Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the
Nondelegation Doctrine's Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1299 (2003) (same).
78. Alexander & Prakash, supra note 70, at 1038.
79. See Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CI. L. REV.
1721, 1722, 1762 (2002). Professor Cass Sunstein has taken a middle ground. He suggests that the
Supreme Court has recast the doctrine in the form of "nondelegation canons," which narrowly
constrain agency action absent a "dear congressional statement" to the contrary. Sunstein, supra
note 76, at 316, 338.
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constitutional basis for challenging legislative action, 80 it continues to operate
as a loose constraint on agency action. In theory, Congress must adequately
articulate "intelligible principles" to which administrative agencies must
conform in exercising the power to legislate. 81 But in practice, even the most
broadly drawn parameters are deemed sufficient to withstand constitutional
challenge. 8 2
Nevertheless, the nondelegation doctrine implicitly assumes, at least in
theory, that an agency will exercise its delegated authority within the specific
constraints imposed by Congress in the agency's authorizing legislation. 83 As
applied by the Supreme Court in recent times, the nondelegation doctrine
simply means, as a practical matter, that the legal boundaries confining an
agency's interpretive power are primarily statutory rather than constitutional in
nature. In the absence of constitutional constraints on delegations of legislative
power, judicial review of an agency's exercise of statutory authority provides a
critical check on executive power.
Once it was settled that Congress, within broad constraints, may delegate
lawmaking authority to the executive branch, it was a natural evolutionary step
for the Court to gradually adopt an attitude of deference to interpretations by
agencies of their own authorizing statutes. However, this development would
further blur the lines separating the three branches of government. 84
C. Early Deference Doctrines
During the New Deal and World War II eras, the Supreme Court declined
to apply the same deferential standard of review to agency adjudication and
rulemaking as it applied to statutes and judgments. In SEC v. Chenery Corp.,85
80. For a recent but short-lived example, see South Dakota v. Dep't of Interior, 69 F.3d 878,
884-85 (8th Cir. 1995) (striking down § 465 of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) as contrary to
nondelegation doctrine), vacated, 519 U.S. 919 (1996). But see, e.g., Carcieri v. Norton, 423 F.3d 45 (1st
Cir. 2005) (upholding IRA § 465 over nondelegation doctrine challenge), on reh'g en banc sub nom.,
Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2007), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Carcieri v.
Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009).
81. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,409 (1928).
82. See generally Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472-76 (2001) (upholding
broad delegation of legislative power to EPA).
83. See id. at 475 ("[Tmhe degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the
scope of the power congressionally conferred."). Chevron itself, and perhaps other deference
regimes, may be considered "nondelegation canons." See Sunstein, supra note 76, at 316,338.
84. See infra note 682; see also Michael E. Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation
and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 188 (1992). "[Chevron] frankly recognizes
that Congress does hand over largely unfettered policy-making authority to agencies." Id. But cf.
AMAN, supra note 49, at 32-33 (expressing concern that intense judicial scrutiny of environmental
regulation during the 1970"s blurred constitutionally mandated distinctions among the branches).
85. 318 U.S. 80 (1943). The Court observed that "a reviewing court, in dealing with a
determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must
judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency." Id. at 88. SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), still governs when the Court reviews agency adjudications. See,
e.g., Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 128 S. Ct. 2733, 2745 (2008) (FERC
adjudication) (citing Chenery); see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1838
(2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Chenery).
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for example, the Court insisted that an administrative agency set out its explicit
reasoning for developing a disputed policy position.86 The Court declined to
invent its own reasoning to justify agency action, 87 restricting its review to the
specific rationale expressly invoked by the agency to support its decision in the
first instance. 88
Two of the Supreme Court's earliest decisions addressing judicial deference
to agency interpretations have reassumed center stage: Skidmore v. Swift & Co.89
and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. 90 Although both predated the APA, they
continue to strongly influence the Supreme Court's evolving deference
framework. While neither addressed notice-and-comment rulemaking, both
shed helpful light on the various common-law deference regimes regularly
invoked by the Roberts Court.
The Skidmore plaintiffs worked in defendant's meat packing plant. They
sought overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for time they
spent on call at the plant's fire hall after normal duty hours.91 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed the trial court's "conclusion of law" that on-call time was not working
time because plaintiffs were entitled to engage in pleasurable activities at the
fire hall, subject to call.92 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither the
FLSA nor case law precluded the district court as a matter of law from classifying
waiting time as compensable. 93 Rather, whether plaintiffs had engaged in
compensable work while on call was a question of fact under the
circumstances. 94
Skidmore noted that no administrative agency was specifically charged with
adjudicating FLSA disputes, but Congress had established the Office of
Administrator, empowered to seek injunctive relief to remedy violations. 95 As
the Court observed, the Administrator had issued "an interpretive bulletin and
several informal rulings" concerning FLSA enforcement. 9 6 The Court notably
found no statute suggesting how much deference the courts should pay those
interpretations. 97 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that policy statements
86. Chenery, 318 U.S. at 88 (distinguishing review of lower court decisions from review of
agency actions).
87. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938) (reasoning that where
legislative judgment is questioned, judicial inquiry must be restricted to whether any state of facts
could reasonably be assumed that would support it).
88. Chenery, 318 U.S. at 94. This stringent standard of judicial review suggests that the Court
put the burden of persuasion on the agency to defend its regulatory action, rather than imposing
the burden of persuasion on the challenging party.
89. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
90. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
91. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 135.
92. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 136 F.2d 112, 113 (5th Cir. 1943), rev'd, 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
93. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
94. Id. at 136-37. In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944), the Court distinguished
the administrative process of applying law to the facts from the judicial function of interpreting law
in the abstract. Id. at 130-31.
95. 323 U.S. at 137.
96. Id. at 138.
97. Id. at 139. Skidmore was decided two years before the APA was enacted.
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issued as part of the Administrator's official duties and based upon his
specialized expertise 98 were persuasive, if not binding, legal authority:99
[Tihe rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this
Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in
a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade,
if lacking power to control. 100
On remand, the district court was directed to consider the persuasive value of
the Administrator's interpretive bulletin, without regard to the lower court's
initial conclusion that waiting time was not compensable as a matter of law.1° 1
A year later, the Supreme Court once again addressed the scope of judicial
review of an agency interpretation. This time the Office of Price Administration
interpreted its own regulations that in turn had interpreted its authorizing
statute.102 In Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 103 the Court held that judicial
deference to an agency's interpretation of law extended as well to an agency's
interpretation of its own regulations, if promulgated in the exercise of
congressional authority.
Since this involves an interpretation of an administrative regulation[,] a court
must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if
the meaning of the words used is in doubt. The intention of Congress or the
principles of the Constitution in some situations may be relevant in the first
instance in choosing between various constructions. But the ultimate
criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling
98. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (noting the importance of agency expertise in
justifying broad delegations of statutory authority during the New Deal).
99. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. The Court also rejected the notion that the agency's interpretation
was any less persuasive in the form of an interpretive ruling rather than an adjudication. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. To Justice Scalia's consternation, Mead breathed new life into Skidmore deference. See
Mead, 533 U.S. at 227. In Mead, for example, Scalia noted:
[Tihe Court now resurrects, in full force, the pre-Chevron doctrine of Skidmore
deference . . . whereby "[tihe fair measure of deference . . . var[ies] with
circumstances[.]" ... The Court has largely replaced Chevron, in other words, with
that test most beloved by a court unwilling to be held to rules (and most feared by
litigants who want to know what to expect): th' ol' "totality of the circumstances"
test.
Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
102. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 412-13 (1945).
103. Id. Seminole Rock was decided after Skidmore but before Congress enacted the APA.
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weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. 104
Seminole Rock addressed a 1942 price-control regulation applicable to the
sale of crushed stone. 10 5 The Court initially resolved an ambiguity in the
regulation as applied to the facts,106 finding it persuasive that the Office had
interpreted the regulation in the same manner in an explanatory bulletin to
manufacturers and vendors. 10 7 Lending additional support, the interpretation
was published in the Administrator's first quarterly report to Congress. 10 8
Finally, the same interpretation had been uniformly offered in "countless"
informal responses to others similarly affected by maximum price
determinations. 10 9 The agency's interpretation was ultimately upheld based
upon its consistent application over time, in light of the Court's independent
interpretation of the ambiguous regulation. 110
While Skidmore and Seminole Rock have been criticized, 111 each retains its
vitality as a Supreme Court precedent influencing judicial deference to agency
interpretations. 1 1 2  Both cases anticipated a category of administrative
interpretations that the APA would soon define as "interpretative rules," as
distinguished from more formal "legislative rules. " 113 In Part III, we will return
to a discussion of these two cases and their continuing influence on judicial
deference doctrines.
104. See id. at 413-14. The Seminole Rock Court did not address the statutory or constitutional
validity of the agency's interpretation for jurisdictional reasons unique to the times. The only issue
was the proper interpretation of the agency's regulation. Even if its validity had been challenged, the
Emergency Court of Appeals had exclusive jurisdiction to decide that issue. Id. at 418-19.
105. Id. at 412.
106. Id. at 415-17.
107. Id. at 417. Note that the Court independently interpreted the regulation by resolving the
ambiguity before turning to the agency's informal interpretation for support. See id. at 415-17.
108. Id. at 417.
109. Id. at 418.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 589 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Skidmore deference to authoritative agency views is an anachronism, dating from an era in which
we declined to give agency interpretations ... authoritative effect."); John F. Manning, Constitutional
Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLuM. L. REV. 612, 639-
40 (1996) (questioning constitutionality of Seminole Rock deference); see also infra note 383 (quoting
Justice Scalia's recent public comments critiquing Skidmore deference).
112. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269 (2005) (applying Skidmore to Attorney
General's interpretive ruling, finding it unpersuasive); see also, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,
461 (1997) (applying "deferential standard" of Seminole Rock to uphold interpretation of regulation
governing FLSA exemption). Seminole Rock has been called "[tlhe classic case" espousing "[olne of
the most venerable doctrines in administrative law." 3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW & PRACTICE § 11.26 (2d ed. 2006).
113. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2006) (generally exempting interpretative rules from notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedures). In contrast to legislative rules, interpretive rules lack the force of
law. While courts often give them deference, interpretive rules are not binding. Joseph v. U.S. Civil
Svc. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1154 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1977). But cf. Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d
918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("[I]t simply is not the law of this circuit that an interpretive regulation
does not receive the Chevron deference accorded a legislative regulation."). An agency may issue
legislative rules only if Congress has delegated that power to the agency. Otherwise, agency rules
are merely interpretative. Joseph, 554 F.2d at 1154 n.26. See generally Robert A. Anthony, Which
Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 42-63 (1990).
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D. Administrative Procedure Act
Following years of controversy and compromise between the executive
branch and the American Bar Association over the ever-expanding role of
administrative decision making, 114 Congress in 1946 unanimously enacted the
APA. 115 One scholar described the resulting legislation as "a sophisticated
instrument of considerable intricacy." 116 A primary goal of the APA was to
strengthen and improve the administrative process, in part by maintaining
basic limits on the scope of judicial review. 117
The APA's underlying theme was to distinguish rulemaking from
adjudication.118 It expressly acknowledged that the purpose of rulemaking is to
determine policy; 119 agency adjudication, on the other hand, is designed to
resolve disputes involving specific parties and particularized facts.120 Thus, the
procedures the APA prescribed for rulemaking and adjudication were
"radically different," rendering the proper classification of agency action "of
fundamental importance."121
Section 4, which governs "informal" rulemaking, was specifically drafted to
114. See supra note 59 and accompanying text; see also AMAN, supra note 49, at 16 (describing
political and philosophical controversies surrounding APA's enactment); PIERCE, supra note 45, at
15; George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal
Politics, 90 Nw. U.L. REV. 1557, 1570-73 (1996).
[Tihe fight over the APA was a pitched political battle for the life of the New Deal.
The more than a decade of political combat that preceded the adoption of the APA
was one of the major political struggles in the war between supporters and
opponents of the New Deal. ... [T]he shape of the administrative law statute that
emerged would determine the shape of the policies that the New Deal
administrative agencies would implement.
The APA that finally emerged in 1946 did not represent a unanimous social
consensus about the proper balance between individual rights and agency powers.
The APA was a hard-fought compromise that left many legislators and interest
groups far from completely satisfied. Congressional support for the bill was
unanimous only because many legislators recognized that, although the bill was
imperfect, it was better than no bill. The APA passed only with much grumbling.
Id. at 1560.
115. PIERCE, supra note 45, at 15; see also APA MANUAL, supra note 60, at 6 (noting that the APA
was enacted without dissenting vote). President Truman signed the APA into law on June 11, 1946.
Id. at 5. The APA, as amended, is codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3344, 6362, 7562
(2006). PIERCE, supra note 45, at 15.
116. Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don't Get It, 10
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 34 (1996).
117. PIERCE, supra note 45, at 15; see APA MANUAL, supra note 60, at 9 (summarizing APA's four
basic purposes, which include "restat[ing] the law of judicial review").
118. APA MANUAL, supra note 60, at 15.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 50. "The [APA] is based upon a broad and logical dichotomy between rule making
and adjudication, i.e., between the legislative and judicial functions." Id.
121. APA MANUAL, supra note 60, at 12; see id. at 111 (reprinting APA § 2(c)-(d) as originally
enacted); see also 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)-(7) (2006) (defining "rule," "rule making," "order," and
"adjudication" in terms virtually identical to the original language).
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guarantee the public the right to participate. 122 Agencies generally must
provide public notice of a proposed substantive rule, allowing interested
persons to present their viewpoints before the agency finalizes the rule. 123 This
process is better known as "notice-and-comment" rulemaking. 124
The APA, then and now, explicitly makes exceptions to the general rule
favoring notice-and-comment rulemaking (1) "where notice or hearing is
[otherwise] required by statute," 125 and (2) for "interpretative rules, general
statements of policy, rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice, or in
any situation in which the agency for good cause finds.., that notice and
public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
public interest." 126
The APA also provides explicit and more or less specific guidelines for
judicial review of agency interpretations of law. 127 Section 10128 unequivocally
sets forth the standard of judicial review for agency interpretations, specifically
"agency action," 129 expressly defined in the APA to include agency rules.130
The relevant APA sections governing judicial review currently provide as
follows:
To the extent necessary to [the] decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms
of an agency action. The reviewing court shall -
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
122. APA MANUAL, supra note 60, at 26. Section 4 is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
123. APA MANUAL, supra note 60, at 26; see 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006).
124. KERWIN, supra note 48, at 52; JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING
5-6 (3d ed. 1998) (explaining derivation of notice-and-comment label). As distinguished from
"informal" notice-and-comment rulemaking, the APA also provides for "formal rulemaking" when
a statute (other than the APA) specifically provides for a hearing and rulemaking "on the record."
Id. at 5; see 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006). These rarely invoked formalities characterize ratemaking
proceedings and other narrow categories of rulemaking unique to specific federal agencies.
LUBBERS, supra, at 5.
125. APA MANUAL, supra note 60, at 114 (original text of APA § (4)(a)). See supra note 124
(discussion of formal rulemaking).
126. APA MANUAL, supra note 60, at 114 (original text of APA § (4)(a)). Compare id. with 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b) (2006).
127. By 1946, the Supreme Court had already articulated its own administrative deference
doctrines in Skidmore and Seminole Rock. Given the close proximity of those important decisions to
the controversial enactment of the APA, its judicial review provisions must be analyzed in light of
the common law deference doctrines that were already well under development by 1946.
128. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
129. Id. § 704.
130. Id. §§ 551(13), 701. APA § 10, now codified at 5 U.S.C. § 706, took effect on September 11,
1946. APA MANUAL, supra note 60, at 93 (citing APA § 12, which provided effective dates for each
provision). In Supreme Court briefs filed after its effective date, the Department of Justice took the
position that the APA did not apply to cases then pending. Id. A year later, noting the absence of
any express reference in the Court's opinions to APA § 10, the Attorney General surmised "that the
Court has accepted this construction." Id. at 94 (citations omitted). Perhaps the better implication is
that the Court tacitly disregarded APA § 10 altogether.
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found to be -
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right; [or]
(D) without observance of procedure required by law[.]
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole
record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of
the rule of prejudicial error. 131
Ironically, Supreme Court references to the APA have been noticeably
lacking, particularly since Chevron was decided. 132 The best example of this
striking phenomenon is Chevron itself. Although the Chevron Court claimed to
have set forth well-settled principles of judicial deference to agency
interpretations, 133 the opinion failed to acknowledge the statutory standards of
judicial review in either the APA or the Clean Air Act 134 that explicitly relate to
agency rulemaking.
More recent Supreme Court opinions have occasionally cited the APA, but
only in passing.135 Yet the APA unambiguously requires the reviewing court to
"decide all relevant questions of law, interpret.., statutory provisions, and
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action,"'136
broadly defined in the APA to include agency rules. 137 It is almost as if the
APA's judicial review provisions were implicitly repealed by Chevron. 138
131. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
132. Compare Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
548 (1978) and Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 89 (1983)
with Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1993) and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
133. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 ("We have long recognized that considerable weight should be
accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations.") (citations omitted).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (2006).
135. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1172 n.3 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United
States v. Eurodif S.A., 129 S. Ct. 878, 886-87 n.6 (2009) (Souter, J.); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S.
715, 765, 786 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring). But cf. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226, 227 & n.6, 229 (Souter, J.)
(citing APA provisions in support of deference analysis applied to Customs tariff classifications).
136. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
137. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006) (defining "rule"). As the APA broadly defines the term, "rule"
includes both legislative and interpretive rules. See id. The uniform APA standard of review
undercuts the Court's common law distinction between "legislative rules" and "interpretative
rules."
138. See John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEx. L. REv. 113, 120
(1998). Professor Duffy has acknowledged and aptly described this odd phenomenon of
administrative law: "[Sitatutory law and judge-made doctrines continue an uneasy coexistence that
cannot be reconciled with the theoretical limits on federal common law." Id. As an example of the
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Indeed, Dean Aman has observed that after the APA took effect, "agency
interpretations of law rarely received the judicial scrutiny that the APA itself
would allow." 139 Consistent with early common law doctrines, the APA
provided for relatively deferential review of agency fact-finding and policy
decisions. 140 On questions of policy, the APA codified the "rational basis"
doctrine the courts applied when reviewing the constitutionality of social and
economic legislation.141  But Section 10, which undoubtedly applied to
questions of law, was silent on the degree of judicial deference due agency
interpretations. 142 While the explicit wording of Section 10 plainly allowed for
traditional de novo review, the courts nevertheless continued to develop
elaborate deference doctrines. 143 Judicial deference "regimes," as some scholars
refer to them, 144 are essentially common law doctrines developed without
regard to the APA.145
The "uneasy coexistence" 146 of federal common law deference doctrines
and the APA's plain language raised provocative questions about the balance of
powers between Congress, the federal judiciary, and the executive branch. For
example, in 1982, then-Dean Guido Calabresi proposed what he conceded was
a "quite radical" approach to the "statutorification of American law and to the
growing obsolescence of statutes." 147 He suggested that courts should have the
power to amend outdated statutes, just as they have always modified common
law doctrines-by altering or even abandoning the written law.148 Calabresi
argued in favor of "judicial common law review of statutes" that are no longer
consistent with "dominant principles." 1
49
In support of his "hypothetical doctrine," 150 Dean Calabresi suggested that
Dean James Landis had foreseen the need for such an approach during the New
slow transformation of administrative law from "a common-law method to a more rigorous
statutory method based on the APA," he cites Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 145 (1993). Id. In
Darby, the Supreme Court acknowledged and applied an APA provision dealing with exhaustion of
administrative remedies, which to the Court's surprise "had been almost completely ignored in
judicial opinions" for more than 45 years. Darby, 509 U.S. at 145 (quoting 4 KENNETH CULp DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 26.12, at 468-69 (2d ed. 1983)).
139. AMAN, supra note 49, at 8 & n.8 (comparing Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485
(1947), and NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944), with APA's judicial review
provisions codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-706 (1982)).
140. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006); see id. § 706(2)(E), (F).
141. See AMAN, supra note 49, at 160 n.9; see also id. at 22-23 ("On questions of policy, the courts
equated administrators with legislators. On matters pertaining to the application of law, courts
allowed administrators the interpretive discretion normally reserved to judges.") (footnotes and
citations omitted).
142. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944) (noting absence of statute suggesting
the level of deference courts should give informal agency interpretations).
143. See AMAN, supra note 49, at 8.
144. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 4, at 1090-91, 1095.
145. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
146. Duffy, supra note 138, at 120; see CALABRESI, supra note 67, at 4-5.
147. CALABRES], supra note 67, at 81, 83.
148. Id. at 82.
149. Id. at 90.
150. Id. at 82.
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Deal when he posited that once statutes became a dominant mode of
lawmaking, they could no longer "live apart from the common law." 151
Perhaps coincidentally, 152 Calabresi's radical proposal predated the Supreme
Court's watershed decision in Chevron by just two years. By tacitly ignoring the
judicial review provisions of the APA and Clean Air Act, the Chevron Court
implicitly endorsed Calabresi's novel and activist approach to judicial review.
In that respect, APA Section 10 has become a dead letter by atrophy and judicial
nullification. 15
3
Thus, the federal courts have declined to abide by the standard of review
codified in the APA for questions of law. Instead, they continue, in effect, to
exercise common law deference to administrative interpretations of law. 154 As
discussed in Part IV, the lenient deference regimes that evolved after the New
Deal and before enactment of the APA continue to strongly influence the
Supreme Court when it reviews agency interpretations of law. 155 Whether the
Court's common law deference doctrines can be reconciled with the plain
language of the APA remains to be seen.
E. Presidential and Congressional Initiatives
During the decade following its enactment, judicial interpretations of the
APA were generally deferential to its purposes. 15 6 Yet political controversy
continued unabated regarding the scope of quasi-judicial functions undertaken
by the executive branch.
In 1955, the President's Commission on Organization of Executive Branch
151. Id. at 85-86 & n.15 (citing JAMES M. LANDIS, STATUTES AND THE SOURCES OF LAW, HARVARD
LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (1934)).
152. CALABRESI, supra note 67, at 1-2, 7, 21, 81, 163. Dean Calabresi has addressed the
"statutorification" or petrification of American law. He observed that "delegation of authority to
administrative agencies was the paradigmatic New Deal response to the danger of legal
petrification," id. at 21, by which he meant statutory obsolescence. See id. at 21-26. Justice Scalia,
appointed to the Court in 1986, has famously developed his own rubric that apparently echoes
Dean Calabresi's, frequently chastising the majority for permitting "ossification" of statutory
interpretations. E.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. But see Sorrells .v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 450 (1932) (Hughes, C.J.) ("Judicial
nullification of statutes, admittedly valid and applicable, has, happily, no place in our system."); cf.
Graham, supra note 31, at 239.
Classic Chevron analysis is dead. In place of Chevron, the older Skidmore approach is a
better predictor of whether courts will uphold or overrule federal agency
interpretations of statute. We can also expect courts generally to follow a model ...
which bypasses any consideration of agency regulations and goes right to the court's
own reading of the statute.
Id.
154. AMAN, supra note 49, at 17 ("The legal discourse used to justify such extensions of agency
power relied upon broad notions of congressional intent and was usually cast in a legal rhetoric
particularly familiar to the common-law minded judges who wrote these opinions.") (footnotes and
citations omitted); see also id. at 24.
155. Cf. id. at 22, 24.
156. See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36-45 (1950) (describing legislative
history and purpose of the APA with approval); PIERCE, supra note 45, at 16.
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of the Government, better known as the Hoover Commission, issued a
controversial report recommending establishment of an Administrative Court
within the judicial branch.157 As proposed, the Court would have initially
subsumed the quasi-judicial functions of several major administrative
agencies. 158 The Commission predicted that more specialized adjudicatory
functions would be transferred to the Court over time as it proved its
effectiveness. 159
The Hoover Commission expressed concern that Congress had frequently
authorized only limited judicial review of agency action, or had precluded it
altogether. 160 The Commission ominously cautioned that "[tihe courts, as the
guardians of the rule of law, must be in a position to review all administrative
action, or the rule of law is destroyed." 161 The Commission's final report
proposed nineteen distinct amendments to the APA to implement its
recommendations. 162 The ABA proposed a new Code of Administrative
Procedure in response, which would have enacted many of the Commission's
controversial recommendations.
In a 1961 executive order, President Kennedy established the
Administrative Conference of the United States as a successor to the Hoover
Commission. 163 Its mission was to encourage cooperative efforts to improve
federal administrative procedure. The Conference included representatives of
the executive branch, administrative agencies, the practicing bar, scholars, and
others with special knowledge and experience in administrative law. 164 The
President directed the Conference to periodically report its conclusions and
recommendations to him.165  Three years later, Congress enacted the
Administrative Conference Act 166 to ensure its continuity. 167
Perhaps in part because of the ongoing success of the Administrative
157. PIERCE, supra note 45, at 16-17.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 81.
160. Id. at 77.
161. Id. (concluding that claimants must "have a day in court to test the exercise of
administrative action in the light of the authority conferred by Congress.").
162. CmZENS COMM. FOR THE HOOVER REPORT, DIGESTS & ANALYSES OF THE NINETEEN HOOVER
COMMISSION REPORTS 82-84 (1955).
163. Exec. Order No. 10,934, 3 C.F.R. §§ 464-65 (1963).
164. Id.
165. Id. As originally established, the Conference was to submit its final report no later than
December 31, 1962. The report recommended continuation and expansion of the Conference to
include both government representatives and outside experts. See FINAL REPORT OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: SUMMARY OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
CONFERENCE (Dec. 15,1962).
166. Pub. L. 88-499, 78 Stat. 615 (1964) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 591-96 (2006)).
167. Thirty years later, however, Congress failed to appropriate funds for fiscal year 1996, and
the Administrative Conference terminated operations. See Reauthorization of the Administrative
Conference of the United States: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm.
on Judiciary, 108th Cong, 2d Sess. (May 20 & June 24, 2004), at 17 (remarks of Rep. Watt), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/Legacy/93774.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Reauthorization
Hearing]; see Gary J. Edles, The Continuing Need for an Administrative Conference, 50 ADMIN. L. REV.
101, 137 (1998) (explaining reasons for its termination).
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Conference in generating cooperation among competing interests, the political
and institutional controversies associated with the Hoover Commission
gradually subsided. The Conference worked well to achieve consensus and
made a number of significant contributions to administrative law.168 By 1970,
the ABA had abandoned its proposal for a new code in favor of recommending
less sweeping revisions to the APA, which the Conference endorsed in part in
1973.169 Undoubtedly, the Administrative Conference played a significant role
in quelling political concerns about administrative agencies' increasingly
influential role in lawmaking and adjudication. 170
F. The "Hard Look" Doctrine
Administrative rulemaking, rather than adjudication, became the most
pervasive form of agency regulation during the 1970's.171 Congress enacted
numerous initiatives that conferred broad rulemaking powers to agencies such
as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Federal Trade
Conmmission, and the Environmental Protection Agency, among others. 172 In
particular, technically complex, far-reaching environmental concerns took
center stage, supplanting the pressing social and economic issues that had
characterized the New Deal.173 Agencies increasingly adopted rulemaking as
their primary mode of decision making. 174 In some instances, Congress
established agency-specific rulemaking procedures and judicial review
standards that superseded the APA. 175
The Supreme Court began to devise a more "searching and skeptical"
approach to judicial review in response to the burgeoning and more
substantively complex rulemaking authority Congress repeatedly delegated to
agencies. 176 As one scholar put it, "The deference the courts had shown
168. See, e.g., Reauthorization Hearing, supra note 167, at 5-7 (letter from William Funk, Chair,
ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice); Sally Katzen, Testimony Before the
House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations in
Support of the Reauthorization of the Administrative Conference of the United States: The Role of the
Administrative Conference in Improving the Regulatory Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 649,655-64 (1994).
169. PIERCE, supra note 45, at 22-23 (citing 3 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE (1973-1974), at 53-63,567-609).
170. Congress recently reauthorized the Administrative Conference, appropriating $1.5 million
to fund its operating expenses for fiscal year 2009. See Pub. L. 111-8 (signed March 11, 2009).
However, those funds have gone unexpended. On November 3, 2009, President Obama nominated
Professor Paul Verkuil to serve as Director of the reestablished Administrative Conference. The
Senate Judiciary Committee reported his nomination favorably to the full Senate on December 10,
2009. On March 3, 2010, his nomination was confirmed by the Senate.
171. See Bryner, supra note 64, at 23; M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71
U. CmI. L. REV. 1383, 1384-1385, 1398 (2004).
172. BRYNER, supra note 64, at 23; see AMAN, supra note 49, at 26 (noting considerable growth in
administrative bureaucracy between 1966 and 1981); Magill, supra note 171, at 1398.
173. AMAN, supra note 49, at 24-26.
174. Id.; Magil, supra note 171, at 1398.
175. See AMAN, supra note 49, at 40 (noting that some "hybrid" rulemaking statutes called for
application of a substantial evidence test on judicial review); LUBBERS, supra note 124, at 3; see also 5
U.S.C. §§ 559, 701(a) (allowing for specific statutory exceptions to APA judicial review).
176. KERWIN, supra note 48, at 260-62.
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Congress and its agents during the New Deal era was revoked." 177 In Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 178 decided in 1971, the Court applied a level of
judicial scrutiny to agency reasoning that was "searching and careful." 179
The issue in Overton Park was whether the Secretary of Transportation had
appropriately taken into account the likely effects on the environment in
approving a highway project through a city park site. 180 The authorizing
statute required the Secretary to undertake "all possible planning to minimize
harm" 181 when routing highways over public parklands. Characterizing the
issue as one of law rather than policy,182 the Court held that the appropriate
standard of review was more stringent than the APA's generally deferential
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. 183 Specifically, the Court questioned
whether the agency had taken relevant factors into account and whether the
agency had committed a "clear error" in judgment.184
The Court's new approach to judicial review that scrutinized the reasoning
process supporting the agency's interpretation would become known as the
"hard look" doctrine. 185 Throughout the 1970's and early 1980's, the Court
generally followed a pattern of heightened judicial review of agency
rulemaking. The decision that became the hallmark - and the end point - of the
"hard look" era was Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.186 The State Farm Court held that an agency rule was
invalid
if the agency... relied on factors Congress had not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before it or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or a product
177. AMAN, supra note 49, at 28. Ironically, however, the earliest case cited as an example of the
"hard look" doctrine was SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (requiring agency to adequately
explain its reasoning for reaching its discretionary decision). See supra notes 85-88 and
accompanying text.
178. 401 U.S. 402 (1971), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).
179. Id. at 416. See also AMAN, supra note 49, at 28 (arguing that in Overton Park "the Court
turned an otherwise discretionary environmental statute into an absolutist one"); see also id. at 168
n.139.
180. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 405 & n.2 (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1964 Supp. V)).
181. Id. at 411 (citing 23 U.S.C. § 138).
182. See id. at 414-15 (holding that while a presumption of regularity attached, that did not
shield the agency's actions from "a thorough, probing in-depth review").
183. Id. at 416; see also AMAN, supra note 49, at 39.
184. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
185. KERWIN, supra note 48, at 260-62. Judge Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit has been credited
with authoring an early example of the "hard look" doctrine in Greater Boston Television Corp. v.
FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). See AMAN, supra note 49, at 35,
39. The case involved a television station's application to renew its operating license. During the
proceedings, the FCC departed from its usual practice in reviewing renewal applications. On
appeal, Judge Leventhal held that the court was required to take a "hard look" to ensure the FCC
had engaged in "reasoned decision-making." "[An agency changing its course must supply a
reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not
casually ignored .... " Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d at 852-53.
186. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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of agency expertise. 187
The "hard look" doctrine insisted that agencies make their reasoning
process explicit.188 As one author observed, hard-look deference (or perhaps
more accurately non-deference) "tended to demand right answers, not just
examples of agency reasoning ... ."189 In effect, "hard-look" courts adopted a
heightened standard of review. Courts exercised greater oversight, and
consequently deferred to agencies less often, than did courts applying more
deferential New Deal standards of review. 190
The "hard look" doctrine entailed greater procedural scrutiny in addition
to enhancing substantive review of agency reasoning.191 For the better part of a
decade, the Supreme Court was relatively tolerant of the additional procedural
constraints federal courts imposed on agency rulemaking. But the Court called
a halt in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 192 Vermont Yankee held that a reviewing court could not reverse an agency
rule for procedural reasons as long it complied with minimum procedural
requirements of the APA. 193 As discussed in Parts III and IV, some of the key
features of "hard look" review have nevertheless continued to influence
deference jurisprudence. 194
By the early 1980's, following election of President Reagan, the
constitutionality of broad delegations of legislative power came under renewed
scrutiny.195 Immediately upon taking office, Reagan announced that one of his
primary objectives was to get the federal government "off of the backs of the
people." 196 One month later, an executive order 197 directed the Office of
Management and Budget to review each "major" rule proposed by an
agency. 198 Agencies were directed to submit a Regulatory Impact Analysis for
each proposed major rule, including specific information regarding its potential
187. Id. at 43.
188. Compare id. at 43-44 with SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943) ("We merely hold that an
administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in
exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.").
189. AMAN, supra note 49, at 40 (emphasis in original).
190. See id. at 24-26, 40.
191. Id. at 33-35.
192. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
193. Id. at 548-49.
194. E.g., Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-31 (emphasizing process considerations); see Gillian E. Metzger,
The Story of Vermont Yankee: A Cautionary Tale of Judicial Review and Nuclear Waste, in
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 124, at 162-63 (Peter L. Strauss ed. 2006) (explaining Vermont Yankee's
minimal effect on courts' expansive readings of the APA's procedural requirements). But see FCC v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009) (5-4 opinion) (rejecting argument that a
change in agency policy warrants "more searching review" than an initial policy determination).
195. See AMAN, supra note 49, at 103-04. For example, in 1980 and 1981, Chief Justice Rehnquist
signaled his interest in resurrecting the nondelegation doctrine. See Ind. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v.
Am. Petroleum Inst., 446 U.S. 607, 672 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v.
Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
196. AMAN, supra note 49, at 66 (citations omitted).
197. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 7,1981).
198. See generally id. at § 3; Magill, supra note 171, at 1392-93.
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costs and benefits. 199
President Reagan's initiatives to discourage significant legislative
rulemaking had their desired effect, sharply curtailing the number of new
regulatory proposals. 20 0 Not long after, the Court, perhaps unwittingly,201
endorsed congressional delegation of policymaking to agencies 20 2 when it
decided Chevron.203  With that opinion, the Court returned to its more
deferential approach to agency interpretations of law. 204
II. THE CHEVRON "TwO-STEP" 205 DOCTRINE
Before Chevron, federal courts varied widely with respect to the deference
they afforded administrative interpretations. As discussed in Part I, the
Supreme Court had developed two distinct lines of reasoning. 20 6  One,
originating in the New Deal, held that courts should generally defer to an
agency's interpretation of a statute Congress had charged it with administering,
at least if the interpretation had a reasonable basis in the law. 20 7 The other,
representing the "hard look" doctrine, took almost the opposite approach,
199. Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 197, at § 3(d).
200. KERWIN, supra note 48, at 16 (graph illustrating sharp reduction in agency rulemaking in the
early 1980's).
201. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 4, at 1086 & n.7 (referring to Blackmun's notes of Stevens'
comments in conference: "When I am so confused, I go with the agency."). Justice Stevens
acknowledged years later that the unanimous outcome in Chevron "obscured [the Court's] initial
uncertainty about the decision." Justice John Paul Stevens, In Memoriam: Byron R. White, 116 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 2 (2002).
202. See Duffy, supra note 138, at 202 ("Chevron is primarily a case about delegation, not
deference.").
203. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984), quoted in
PIERCE, supra note 45, at 27. While Chevron was nominally a unanimous opinion, Justices Marshall,
Rehnquist, and O'Connor took no part in deciding the case. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
204. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 4, at 1086 (observing that in Chevron, Justice Stevens
"endorsed a very broad rule of deference").
205. The "Chevron two-step" moniker originated with Dean Kenneth Starr, then a judge on the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. See Starr, supra note 34, at 360-66.
206. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. et al.,ADMNISTRATvE LAW & PRocEss 398 (5th ed. 2009); see Pittston
Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976) (acknowledging "two lines of
Supreme Court decisions... which are analytically in conflict, with the result that a court of appeals
must choose the one it deems more appropriate for the case at hand"), affd sub nom., Ne. Marine
Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
207. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. 111 (1944). In Hearst, the Court deferred to the
NLRB's conclusion that newsboys were "employees" and thus entitled to collective bargaining
rights. The Court distinguished between pure questions of law and issues requiring application of
law to facts:
Undoubtedly questions of statutory interpretation, especially when arising in the first
instance in judicial proceedings, are for the courts to resolve, giving appropriate weight
to the judgment of those whose special duty is to administer the questioned statute.
But where the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term... the
reviewing court's function is limited.... [T]he Board's determination that specified
persons are "employees" under this Act is to be accepted if it has "warrant in the
record" and a reasonable basis in law.
Id. at 130-31 (citations omitted).
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scrutinizing the agency's reasoning and procedure, and in some cases
substituting the reviewing court's own interpretation. 
208
In the early 1980's, the Supreme Court's decisions reviewing administrative
interpretations typically followed one of these two deference frameworks and
commonly ignored the other, with little or no explanation. 20 9 Whether and to
what extent the Court would defer to an agency's interpretation of law was
unpredictable, leaving the lower courts with little guidance. Like the Supreme
Court, the federal circuit courts deferred to agency interpretations in some cases
and substituted their own judgment in others. 210 As one administrative law
scholar has observed, "The lower courts had tried to decide the deference
question on a case-by-case basis, producing a recipe for confusion." 211
Reviewing court decisions were frequently inconsistent regarding the
institutional allocation of responsibility for interpreting agency-administered
statutes. 212
Refreshingly, Chevron appeared to articulate a straightforward, two-step
test for judicial review whenever an agency had interpreted an unclear
statute 213 Congress had authorized it to administer. 214  Justice Stevens
succinctly stated Chevron's central holding:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its
own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 
21 5
While apparently espousing a simple two-step approach, Chevron would
prove considerably more complex in application.
208. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 289 (1974) (rejecting NLRB's conclusion that
National Labor Relations Act covered certain managerial employees).
209. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 725 F.2d 761, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that
caselaw under the APA had not "crystallized around a single doctrinal formulation which captures
the extent to which courts should defer"); PIERCE, JR. et al., supra note 206, at 398; see also 5 KENNETH
CuLP DAvIs, ADMINIsTRATvE LAW TREATISE 375 (2d ed. 1978), quoted in PIERCE, supra note 45, at 137.
210. PIERCE, supra note 45, at 138.
211. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 202.
212. PIERCE, supra note 45, at 138.
213. Note that Chevron did not disturb precedents conferring broad discretion to an agency when
interpreting its own ambiguous regulations. See, e.g., Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S.
410, 413-14 (1945); see also, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (citing Seminole Rock with
approval).
214. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,846 (1984).
215. Id. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted).
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Step One: Has Congress unambiguously addressed the precise issue?
To begin, deference to an administrative interpretation expressly assumes
two important prerequisites. First, the reviewing court must determine
whether the statutory language plainly addresses the precise question; if it
does, the reviewing court must carry out the unambiguously expressed
legislative intent.216 Stated more concisely, the statute must be "silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue" 217 before an agency's
interpretation warrants Chevron deference.
A statute is "silent," for example, if it fails to define a term, leaving its
interpretation to the agency charged with implementing the statutory
scheme. 218  To illustrate, Congress failed to define the statutory term
"legitimate medical purpose" in the Controlled Substances Act, and the
Attorney General's interpretation of that term was central to the dispute in
Gonzales v. Oregon.219 When a statute leaves a term undefined, its interpretation
is generally considered a question of law,220 the resolution of which the APA
delegates to the reviewing court.221  Yet Chevron yields to the agency's
interpretation of an undefined statutory term if its other requirements are met.
More commonly, Chevron applies to ambiguous statutes. 222 While the
Court begins with a textual analysis of the statute to determine its ambiguity, it
is not enough if the plain language suggests more than one plausible
interpretation. 223 At the end of a lengthy footnote, Justice Stevens noted that
determining ambiguity- commonly known as Chevron "Step One" 224 -requires
216. Id. at 843. While few would disagree with this basic premise of statutory interpretation, the
Court's decisions illustrate that even this threshold issue-whether a statute's language plainly
resolves a legal issue-is highly debatable. See, e.g., Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710
(2009); Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002).
217. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. This point was clarified by Justice Stevens in INS v. St. Cyr, 533
U.S. 289 (2001). "We only defer... to agency interpretations of statutes that, applying the normal
'tools of statutory construction,' are ambiguous." Id. at 320 n.45 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987)). What the Supreme Court considers normal tools of
statutory construction, however, is not at all clear, adding yet another dimension to Chevron's
complexity.
218. See, e.g., Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, L.L.C. v. Dep't of Agric., 539 F.3d 492, 503 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (2-1 opinion) (upholding regulation defining an undefined statutory term).
219. 543 U.S 1145 (2005); see infra notes 429-53 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Holland v. Pardee Coal Co., 269 F.3d 424, 430 (4th Cir. 2001) (reviewing de novo an
issue of statutory construction, according no deference to district court's interpretation). But see Gill
v. INS, 420 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2005) (affording Chevron deference to agency's interpretation of
undefined statutory term given its expertise in immigration law); cf. Kentuckians for
Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 443-44 (4th Cir. 2003) (reviewing de novo an issue
of statutory construction, but applying Chevron to determine whether agency action was based on
permissible construction).
221. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
222. See, e.g., Bower v. Fed. Express Corp., 96 F.3d 200, 208 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[C]ongressional
delegation to an agency of the power to issue regulations interpreting a statute extends only to the
proper extent of ambiguities in the statute.") (emphasis in original).
223. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 98-99 (2007); FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000).
224. E.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498,1505 n.4 (2009); Eagle Broad. Group,
Ltd. v. FCC, 563 F.3d 543,551 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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the reviewing court to first apply traditional "tools" or canons of statutory
interpretation. 225 In other words, the Court must initially engage in traditional
statutory interpretation, a classic question of law, to decide whether the
agency's interpretation warrants any deference. If "traditional tools of statutory
construction" 2 2 6 resolve the ambiguity, then the Court's interpretation controls,
even if the agency considers the statute ambiguous and interprets it
differently. 227
To those familiar with Justice Scalia's role as cheerleader for Chevron and
his disdain for legislative history, the irony of this analytical step should be
obvious. 228 To resolve a statutory ambiguity, one classic canon of statutory
interpretation requires a court to consult legislative history to determine the
intended meaning. 229 While generally a strong proponent of Chevron, Justice
Scalia rejects legislative history as a legitimate source to resolve ambiguous
statutory language. 230 Therefore, even if Chevron applies, it is not clear which
canons the Court as a whole considers "traditional tools of statutory
construction," or for that matter, how they apply. 23
1
Step 1.5:232 Has Congress delegated rulemaking authority to the agency,
and was the interpretation issued in the exercise of that authority?
Once the Court concludes that Congress has not unambiguously addressed
the issue, it must next determine whether Congress has delegated authority to
225. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 n.9.
226. Id.
227. "[T]here is no need to resolve deference issues when there is no need for deference."
Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 115 n.8 (2002). But cf. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462-
63 (1997) (Scalia, J.) (rejecting argument that longstanding canon of construction should have
resolved ambiguity in agency regulations, as canons apply only to judicial constructions of
ambiguous statutes).
228. Justice Scalia consistently continues to sing the Chevron refrain at every possible
opportunity, even as he eschews legislative history as a means of resolving statutory ambiguity.
See, e.g., Zuni, 550 U.S. at 108 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229. E.g., 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48:4 (7th ed. 2008); see, e.g., Zuni, 550 U.S.
at 106 ("Analysis of legislative history is, of course, a traditional tool of statutory construction.").
But cf. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (Kennedy, J.) (noting
legislative history is vulnerable to serious criticism).
230. See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(referring to legislative history as "an omnipresent makeweight for decisions arrived at on other
grounds").
231. See, e.g., Zuni, 550 U.S. at 99-100, 107 (5-4 opinion) (dividing on whether relevant statutory
language was sufficiently ambiguous to warrant Chevron deference). In his dissent, Justice Scalia
referred to the majority's statutory interpretation in typically colorful language as "sheer
applesauce." Id. at 113 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
232. Some commentators have dubbed this implicit step of the Chevron analysis "Step Zero."
E.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 7, at 836; Sunstein, supra note 7, at 191 & n.19. However, it more
accurately fits in sequence as Step 1.5. See, e.g., Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 112-13
(2002); cf. Note, "How Clear is Clear" in Chevron's Step One?, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1687, 1693 (2005)
(suggesting that institutional considerations inform the determination of ambiguity). But cf.
Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermuele, Chevron Has Only One Step (Harvard Public Law
Working Paper No. 08-24), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
1259816# (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
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the agency to administer a program, either explicitly or implicitly. 233 While
Chevron did not expressly state this prerequisite, its rule of judicial deference
was rooted in Morton v. Ruiz,234 which it quoted with approval: "The power of
an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created and funded
program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules
to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." 235
Chevron was an easy case; the Clean Air Act explicitly directed the EPA to
adopt legislative rules governing ambient air quality. 236 With respect to
implicit delegations of authority, however, scholars have argued for years
whether Chevron applies.237 Also in doubt is whether Chevron applies when
Congress has delegated only limited authority to the agency -for example, to
regulate procedural but not substantive matters.238  Nevertheless, Justice
Stevens made a point of discussing the application of Chevron deference to
statutory delegations, whether explicit or implicit, and most courts have
interpreted Chevron to reach both. 239
Caselaw, however, suggests that the Court may be less willing to defer if
Congress has delegated only general authority to the agency to administer a
statute, as opposed to a specific grant of authority to issue regulations to
implement a statutory initiative. Under the rationale of Morton v. Ruiz, 240 the
Court may be more likely to view a specific delegation of authority as an
indication of congressional intent that the Court should defer to the agency's
interpretation, assuming it is within the scope of that authority. 241
Step Two: Is the agency's interpretation permissible and reasonable?
Even if the court concludes that the statute is silent or ambiguous (Step
One) and that Congress has delegated the agency authority to administer the
statute, whether explicit or implicit (Step 1.5), judicial deference is not
guaranteed. 242 Chevron "Step Two" requires the agency's interpretation of
233. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)); see also
Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("[I]f there is no statute conferring authority, a
federal agency has none.").
234. 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
235. Id. at 231, quoted in Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
236. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 846.
237. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1549-50 (2006).
238. E.g., Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 113-14 (2002) (noting that Title VII limits
EEOC authority to procedural regulations, but declining to decide scope of deference due because
the Court clearly agreed with EEOC's interpretation).
239. E.g., Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 502-03 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 32
(2008). To the extent Chevron entailed an explicit delegation to EPA, however, its discussion of
implicit delegation was mere dicta.
240. 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
241. See Texas, 497 F.3d at 502-03; La. Pub. Servc. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986); cf.
Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("[Mlere ambiguity in a statute is not evidence
of congressional delegation of authority.").
242. Texas, 497 F.3d at 502-03 & n.9.
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explicitly delegated authority to be based on a "permissible construction of the
statute." 243 Justice Stevens cautioned that in making this determination, the
court need not conclude that the agency's interpretation was the only
permissible one, or that the court would have read it the same way had the
question been addressed in litigation. 244 Rather, the agency's interpretation
need only fall within the range of alternatives the reviewing court deems
"permissible" as a matter of law. 245
Chevron went on to elucidate the bounds of a "permissible" construction:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. 246
In summary, Chevron first requires the reviewing court to apply traditional
tools of statutory construction to determine whether the statute unambiguously
addresses the specific issue. 24 7 If it does, no deference is due, and the court's
independent interpretation controls. But if the court concludes that the statute
is silent or ambiguous, it must next decide whether Congress expressly
delegated interpretive authority to the agency seeking deference. 248 If so, a
"legislative regulation" will be sustained unless "arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute." 249 In other words, deference is relatively
broad when Congress has explicitly delegated authority to the agency and its
interpretation is issued within the scope of that delegated authority.
On the other hand, if Congress has only implicitly delegated the agency
authority to address a particular question, the reviewing court will uphold the
agency's interpretation only if "reasonable." 250 In Justice Stevens' words,
243. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (emphasis
added).
244. Id. at 843 n.ll (multiple citations omitted).
245. Id.; see Peter L. Strauss, Within Marbury: The Importance of Judicial Limits on the Executive's
Power to Say What the Law Is, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 59, 60 (2009). The Court's recent decisions
blur the apparent distinction between "permissible" and "reasonable" interpretations. See, e.g.,
United States v. Eurodif S.A., 129 S. Ct. 878, 882, 890 (2009) (holding agency interpretation both
"permissible" and "eminently reasonable").
246. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (emphasis added) (footnote citations omitted). Note the
similarity of this language to APA § 10(2)(A), codified at 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). See supra text
accompanying note 131 (quoting § 706).
247. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004) ("Even for an agency
able to claim all the authority possible under Chevron, deference .. .is called for only when the
devices of judicial construction have been tried and found to yield no clear sense of congressional
intent.") (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987)).
248. See, e.g., Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 113 (2002) (reasoning that the challenged
regulation was within EEOC's explicit statutory authority to adopt procedural regulations).
249. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
250. See Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. v. Oman, 750 F. Supp. 3, 7 (D. D.C. 1990), affd, 969 F.2d
1154 (D.C. Cir. 1992). "In Chevron .. the Court established that judicial review of an agency action
taken with an express grant of authority from Congress is held to an 'arbitrary and capricious'
standard. By contrast, action taken without that express delegation is held to a 'deference if
reasonable' standard." Id. at 7-8 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44). But see, e.g., Barnhart v.
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Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is
implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.
251
Justice Stevens' wording suggests that if the delegation is implicit, an agency
interpretation warrants less deference-not only must it be within legally
permissible bounds, but it must also be "reasonable." Just how much less
deference is due an agency interpretation issued in the exercise of implicitly
delegated authority, and what factors the Court considers to decide whether the
agency's interpretation is reasonable, remain open questions.
III. THE REHNQUIST COURT'S LEGACY: REFRAMING CHEVRON
After William Rehnquist was appointed Chief Justice in 1986, Chevron took
center stage as the deference regime of choice. The Rehnquist Court reached
the apex of judicial deference to administrative interpretations of law in 1997
when it decided Auer v. Robbins,252 discussed next. But just three years later,
the Court began laying the groundwork for reasserting the judicial role in
interpreting statutes by reviving the pre-Chevron multi-factor approach to
determining the scope of deference. 253
Retrenching from the more deferential Chevron framework, the Rehnquist
Court generally limited its heightened deference to adjudications and to
regulations adopted in notice-and-comment proceedings. 254 At the same time,
the Court reinvigorated Skidmore deference for agency interpretations adopted
by less formal means. 255 By the end of the October 2004 Term, the Court
generally applied Chevron if the agency followed APA procedures in issuing
regulations, and otherwise defaulted to Skidmore analysis. What remained was
for the Court to reconcile the revived Skidmore doctrine with its super-
deferential Auer standard.
A. Auer Super-Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulations
The wave of post-Chevron deference arguably crested in 1997 with Auer v.
Robbins,256 a unanimous decision authored by Justice Scalia. 25 7 Some scholars
Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217, 224 (2002) (concluding that "the [Social Security Administration's]
regulation seems a reasonable, hence permissible, interpretation," after acknowledging agency's
explicit statutory authority); Edelman, 535 U.S. at 112-13 (concluding agency's interpretation
"reasonable" after acknowledging its explicit statutory authority to promulgate regulations).
251. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (emphasis added) (footnote citations omitted).
252. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
253. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 591 (2000) (6-3 opinion).
254. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001).
255. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see supra notes 98-100 and
accompanying text.
256. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
257. Id. at 454.
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have suggested that Auer and its World War II-era predecessor, Seminole
Rock, 258 simply mirrored Chevron deference. 259 Others, with whom this author
agrees, have concluded that Auer affords even greater deference to agency
interpretations of their own ambiguous regulations than Chevron yields
interpretations of ambiguous statutes.260 Indeed, a careful reading of Auer
reveals an important basis for distinguishing Auer from its predecessors as a
form of "super-deference." 261 In short, Auer is an outlier and cannot be
reconciled with the Court's more recent deference jurisprudence. 262
The dispute in Auer involved a claim by St. Louis police officers that the
City had erroneously designated them "exempt" from the wage and hour
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).263 The Secretary of Labor,
carrying out specific rulemaking authority conferred by the FLSA, 264 had
issued regulations defining the scope of the exemption, 265 which in part turned
on the outcome of the "salary basis test," 266 defined in the agency's
regulations. 26 7 As one condition for exempt status, an employee's salary could
not be subject to reduction for variations in "work performance." 268 The
officers argued that the mere possibility that their salaries might be reduced was
sufficient to defeat exempt status. The City argued that to be nonexempt, the
officers had to be realistically vulnerable to an actual pay reduction; a
theoretical possibility was not enough. 269
The Court first concluded that the FLSA did not directly address the
issue. 270 At the Court's request, the Secretary of Labor submitted an amicus
258. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). See supra notes 103-10 and
accompanying text.
259. See Manning, supra note 111, at 627; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Democratizing the Administrative
State, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 559, 569 (2006).
260. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 551 (2003); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 4, at 1103; id. at
1184 ("To the extent that Seminole Rock deference exceeds Chevron deference, it is open to abuse by
agencies that try to bootstrap unauthorized policy innovations under cover of interpreting vague
housekeeping rules."); Strauss, supra note 245, at 59 n.23 (noting that the fox-guarding-the-henhouse
problem is compounded by the view that an agency interpreting its own regulations is entitled to
even stronger deference than Chevron). See generally Manning, supra note 111, at 681 (urging the
Court to revisit Seminole Rock).
261. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 4, at 1103. See generally Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up
Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 49, 54-58 (2000).
262. Nevertheless, a slim majority of the Court has very recently (but unconvincingly) attempted
the impossible. See Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2472-74
(2009) (Kennedy, J.) (attempting to reconcile Auer super-deference with analysis of Skidmore-like
persuasive factors).
263. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,455 (1997).
264. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006).
265. Auer, 519 U.S. at 456; see 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1-.3 (1996).
266. Auer, 519 U.S. at 456-57.
267. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1(f), 541.2(e), 541.3(e) (1996).
268. Auer, 519 U.S. at 456 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (1996)) (defining "salary basis" test).
269. Id. at 459. One plaintiff's pay had been reduced for violating the City's residency rule. Id. at
460.
270. Id. at 457.
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brief that interpreted the ambiguous regulation to mean that plaintiffs were
exempt unless the City actually imposed pay reductions - not just in theory but
,as a practical matter." 271 Justice Scalia concluded,
Because the salary-basis test is a creature of the Secretary's own regulations,
his interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, controlling unless "plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." 272 That deferential standard
is easily met here. The critical phrase "subject to [reductions]" comfortably
bears the meaning the Secretary assigns. 273
Admittedly, this language did not vary appreciably from the Court's
previous opinions deferring to an agency's interpretation of its own
regulations. 274 What set Auer apart was that it granted super-deference to an
informal agency interpretation expressed in an amicus brief that the Court had
specifically requested.
In an earlier decision, 275  the Court had disregarded an agency
interpretation embodied in a litigation brief as a "post-hoc" effort to defend the
agency's action.276 Distinguishing that case, Auer held that the Secretary's
amicus brief was nevertheless entitled to deference, even if not the product of
formal rulemaking proceedings, because "[tihere [was] no reason to suspect
that the interpretation [did] not reflect the agency's fair and considered
judgment... ,,277
But Justice Scalia did not stop there. In response to the officers' well-
supported argument that FLSA exemptions should be narrowly interpreted
against the employer, 278 Justice Scalia declined to impose that longstanding
canon of statutory interpretation on the agency:
But that is a rule governing judicial interpretation of statutes and regulations,
not a limitation on the Secretary's power to resolve ambiguities in his own
regulations. A rule requiring the Secretary to construe his own regulations
narrowly would make little sense, since he is free to write the regulations as
broadly as he wishes, subject only to the limits imposed by the statute.279
Auer sweeps all too broadly, conflating the Chevron analysis as applied to an
agency's interpretation of its own rules.280 Without citing support, Auer
271. Id. at 461.
272. Id. (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
273. Id. (dictionary citations omitted).
274. See, e.g., Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,414 (1945).
275. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
276. Id. at 212. The Court has generally given little if any deference to agency interpretations
stated as "litigation positions." See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 485 n.3 (1991) (citing
cases).
277. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,462 (1997).
278. Id.; see, e.g., Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960).
279. Auer, 519 U.S. at 462-63 (emphasis added).
280. See Anthony, supra note 116, at 4 ("The Court has laid down an indulgent if not downright
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ignored the reviewing court's responsibility to resolve any apparent ambiguity
in an agency's legislative rule before deferring to the agency's informal
interpretation. 281
If the Court's rationale for deferring to an agency's interpretation is that
Congress has delegated the agency authority to adopt legislative rules, the
reviewing court has no less responsibility to resolve regulatory ambiguities
than it does statutory ones. In fact, common sense suggests that the Court
should apply even more stringent review of an agency's interpretation of its
own ambiguous regulation; an agency's post-hoc interpretation is even more
attenuated from congressional intent than either a legislative rule or the
authorizing statute itself. Whether statutory or regulatory, a legislative rule has
the force of law, 282 and each warrants judicial interpretation to determine
whether or not it is ambiguous. If either can be judicially interpreted to resolve
any ambiguity, the reviewing court's interpretation should control.
In subsequent decisions, the Court has repeatedly referred to "Auer
deference" rather than Seminole Rock deference, from which it claims to have
been derived. 283  Certainly Auer's "super-deference," which apparently
absolves the agency of any duty to resolve an ambiguity in its own regulation
before adding another layer of interpretive gloss, cannot be reconciled with
Chevron's "two-step" approach. In effect, Auer deference abdicates judicial
responsibility for resolving ambiguities, if that can be done. Nor can Auer be
reconciled with APA section 10(2)(A),284 which requires the reviewing court to
decide all questions of law and interpret the terms of "agency action,"
including, by definition, agency rules.285
Notwithstanding its anomalous reasoning, the Court continues to apply
Auer deference when an agency interprets its own regulations. 286 Nevertheless,
a number of scholars have urged reversal of Seminole Rock and presumably Auer
abject standard of deference toward agencies' interpretations of their own regulations.").
281. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984); see
also Anthony, supra note 116, at 9 (arguing that it is "wrong for the courts to abdicate their office of
determining the meaning of the agency regulation and submissively giving controlling effect to a
not-inconsistent agency position").
In a recent keynote address, Justice Scalia candidly admitted that he has "never been a Step One
- Step Two person." Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address at the Washington College of Law at
American University: Is Chevron Out of Gas? The State of Judicial Review 25 Years after Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (Apr. 24, 2009),
http://media.wcl.american.edu/Mediasite/Viewer/?peid=237e5b365e764f649c12bc265279bf05
(last visited Jan. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Chevron Symposium]. In his view, Step One is beside the
point because an agency interpretation is inherently unreasonable if contrary to the statute's plain
language. Id.
282. E.g., APA MANUAL, supra note 60, at 30 n.3.
283. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147, 1156 (2008); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546
U.S. 243, 257-58 (2006); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000).
284. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006); see Anthony, supra note 116, at 9 (opining that the Court's standard of
deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is "incompatible with the APA").
285. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2006) (defining "agency action" to include "rule").
286. See, e.g., Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2468 (2009);
Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. at 1155; Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171 (2007). But
cf., e.g., Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 257 (declining to apply Auer because underlying regulation merely
parroted relevant statutory language).
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as its progeny. 287 It remains to be seen whether, when, and how the Roberts
Court will reconcile Auer with the increasing constraints a majority of the Court
has imposed on the scope of agency discretion to interpret statutes and
legislative rules.
B. Christensen v. Harris County
Another question left unanswered by Chevron was the appropriate scope of
judicial review applicable to agency interpretations issued by less formal
procedures than notice-and-comment rulemaking. 288 As noted above, Auer
deferred to the Secretary of Labor's regulatory interpretation embodied in an
amicus brief specifically solicited by the Court.289 The Court's opinion all but
disregarded the fact that the interpretation took the form of an appellate brief
rather than a legislative rule.2 90 Yet a coalescing majority of the Court would
not wait long for an opportunity to distinguish the scope of deference due
agency interpretations, depending on the specific nature of the authority
delegated and the relative formality of the rulemaking process.
In Christensen v. Harris County,291 the Court effectively curtailed the reach of
both Chevron and Auer. As had Auer, Christensen interpreted the FLSA as
applied to law enforcement officers-this time, 127 deputy sheriffs.292  The
issue was whether the County could require nonexempt deputies to take
compensatory time off in order to avoid paying them for working overtime.
293
The FLSA expressly permitted state and county employers to grant
compensatory time off rather than pay overtime wages. 294 However, the
statute did not address whether an employer could compel an employee to
deplete earned compensatory time so as not to exceed the number of unpaid
overtime hours that would require the employer to pay wages for any excess.
295
In Auer, the Secretary of Labor's interpretation contradicted the plaintiffs'
argument that they were nonexempt.296 But in Christensen, the Secretary agreed
287. See, e.g., Eskridge & Baer, supra note 4, at 1184 (urging the Court to abrogate Seminole Rock
deference as "contributing to doctrinal confusion"); Strauss, supra note 245, at 65 n.23 (noting
complications associated with conferring more deference to agency interpretations of their own
ambiguous regulations). But see Angstreich, supra note 261 (defending Seminole Rock deference). See
generally Manning, supra note 111 (criticizing Seminole Rock).
288. APA notice-and-comment procedures do not apply "to interpretative rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice .... ." 5 U.S.C. §
553(b)(A) (2006). However, 5 U.S.C. § 706 applies to all "agency actions," not just those issued in
notice-and-comment rulemaking. Chevron left unanswered whether its heightened deference
standard applies to less formal interpretive rules, policy statements, guidances, and manuals.
Christensen and Mead definitively answered that question in the negative.
289. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-63 (1997).
290. Id. at 461.
291. 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (6-3 decision).
292. Id. at 580.
293. See id. at 581.
294. 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (2006).
295. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 580 (citing § 207(o)(3)(A)).
296. Auer, 519 U.S. at 454, 459.
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that the deputy sheriffs should not be compelled to deplete unused
compensatory time to keep the County from having to pay overtime wages. 297
As in Auer, the agency's interpretation was submitted in an amicus brief by
special leave of the Court. 298 Moreover, the Department of Labor had issued an
opinion letter to Harris County 299 at its request, concluding that a government
employer could not compel employees to use compensatory time in lieu of
paying overtime wages.300
The Christensen majority took pains to distinguish Auer, reasoning that the
regulation addressing compensatory time301 was "plainly permissive," unlike
the "ambiguous" regulation at issue in Auer.30 2 For that reason, the Court
concluded that the regulation explicitly allowed Harris County to compel
plaintiffs to deplete their compensatory time to avoid the mandate to pay
overtime wages. 30 3 Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas bluntly observed,
"To defer to the [Secretary of Labor's] position would be to permit the agency,
under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation.
Because the regulation is not ambiguous on the issue of compelled
compensatory time, Auer deference is unwarranted." 304
Before concluding that the regulation was unambiguous, 305 the majority
applied traditional canons of construction30 6 to interpret the statute and its
implementing regulations "from scratch." 30 7 At the same time, the majority
disavowed reliance on Chevron, noting that agency interpretations "lack[ing]
the force of law," 30 8 such as opinion letters, were not entitled to Chevron
deference. 30 9 Citing Skidmore, the Court held that the agency's opinion letter to
297. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 581.
298. Id. at 577, 582; see Auer, 519 U.S. at 453.
299. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 580.
300. Id. at 581 (quoting Opinion Letter from Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div. (Sept. 14, 1992),
available at 1992 WL 845100); id. at 586.
301. 29 C.F.R. § 553.23(a)(2) (1999).
302. "The text of the regulation itself indicates that its command is permissive, not mandatory."
529 U.S. at 588. The Court also accused the agency of "[s]eeking to overcome the regulation's
obvious meaning" by claiming that it was ambiguous, thus warranting Auer deference to the
agency's informal interpretation of the regulation. Id. (emphasis added).
303. Id.
304. Id. Although Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, id. at 589-92, he applied Chevron and
concluded that the agency's informal interpretations of the statute were not reasonable. See id. at
591. In deciding the issue at Step Two, Scalia implicitly reasoned that the statute-and presumably
the Secretary's implementing regulation-were both ambiguous. See id. at 589 (noting that Chevron
presumes "that ambiguities are to be resolved (within the bounds of reasonable interpretation) by
the administering agency"). However, Justice Scalia has consistently conflated the Chevron analysis.
See supra notes 280-81 and accompanying text.
305. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000).
306. See id. at 583.
307. Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002).
308. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
309. Id.
Here ... we confront an interpretation contained in an opinion letter, not one arrived at
after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Interpretations such as those in opinion letters- like interpretations contained in policy
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Harris County was "'entitled to respect,"' but only to the extent it had "'power
to persuade."' 310 Having already independently interpreted the statute and
overtime regulation, the majority concluded that the agency's opinion letter
was simply "unpersuasive." 311
Christensen presaged what Justice Scalia would later declare "one of the
most significant opinions ever rendered by the Court dealing with the judicial
review of administrative action." 312 Each justice comprising the Christensen
majority either authored or joined opinions citing Skidmore with approval. 313
By doing so, a solid majority signaled that it considered Chevron and Skidmore
complementary- and hence reconcilable- deference frameworks. 314  The
following year, the Court squarely held just that.
C. United States v. Mead Corp.
Christensen was only the first of a series of decisions by which the Rehnquist
Court would "cabin" 315 Chevron's expansive influence. Just one year later, in
United States v. Mead Corp.,316 the Court refused to extend Chevron deference to
Customs tariff classification rulings. Mead likened tariff rulings to
"interpretations in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines," which lack the force of law and thus are "beyond the Chevron
pale."317
Mead squarely limited Chevron deference to agency interpretations issued in
the exercise of specific congressional authority to make rules "carrying the force
of law." 318 The Court rejected the Federal Circuit's reasoning that if tariff
rulings did not warrant Chevron deference for lack of notice-and-comment
proceedings, they were due no deference at all. 319 Even if a tariff ruling did not
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of
law- do not warrant Chevron-style deference.
Id. (citations omitted). In dicta, the Court observed that Chevron deference is warranted for at least
two categories of administrative interpretations: (1) legislative rules adopted through notice-and-
comment rulemaking and (2) formal agency adjudications. Id.
310. Id. (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
311. Id. Justice Scalia concurred but explicitly declined to join the holding that Chevron did not
apply. Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., concurring).
312. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 261 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
313. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & O'Connor, Kennedy
& Souter, JJ.); id. at 595 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting); see also id. at 597
(Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.).
314. See, e.g., id. at 587 (holding that while Chevron deference did not apply, the opinion letter
was nevertheless due respect under Skidmore).
315. See, e.g., Richard Murphy, The Brand X Constitution, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1247, 1290. "[A]
dominant theme of Mead remains the Court's effort to cabin the scope of Chevron deference with
procedure." Id.
316. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
317. Id. at 234 (quoting Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587).
318. Id. at 226-27.
319. See id. at 234. The Federal Circuit held that tariff rulings lacked the force of law because
none was intended to apply to anyone other than the subject importer. Id. at 226.
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qualify for Chevron deference, Skidmore might apply regardless of form
depending upon its "power to persuade, if not power to control." 320 Writing
for the majority, Justice Souter succinctly observed, "The Court's choice has
been to tailor deference to variety." 321  The case was remanded with
instructions to consider the persuasiveness of the tariff rulings under
Skidmore.3
22
Mead thus held that even if an agency's interpretation is not entitled to
heightened deference under Chevron, it may nevertheless merit Skidmore
deference based upon its persuasive value. 323 Over Justice Scalia's strident
objections, 324 Mead erased any doubt that "Chevron left Skidmore intact and
applicable where statutory circumstances indicate no [congressional] intent to
delegate general authority to make rules with force of law, or where such
authority [is] not invoked ...- 325
The central holding of Mead should not have been surprising, especially not
to Justice Scalia, 326 best known among the justices as a strict textual
constructionist. Mead simply limited Chevron's holding to its facts and its plain
language, 327 reining in those who had expansively interpreted its presumption
of deference 328 to apply well beyond its facts: an express statutory delegation of
authority to the EPA and a notice-and-comment rulemaking yielding a
legislative rule with the force of law.329 Mead held, however, that even if
Congress did not expressly grant rulemaking authority, it may have done so
implicitly if other circumstances suggest that Congress expected the agency to
"speak with the force of law" when resolving statutory ambiguities. 330 In either
320. Id. at 234; Skidmore v. Swift & Co, 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944). The Court's catchphrase
suggests that if Chevron deference applies, the interpretation is presumptively binding, while Mead
or Skidmore deference confers more or less persuasive value depending upon various factors. See
Mead, 533 U.S. at 234.
321. Id. at 236 (citations omitted).
322. Id. at 238-39.
323. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
324. Mead, 533 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
325. Id. at 237 (acknowledging that the Court was so holding). The latter phrase pointedly
suggests that agencies to which Congress has delegated authority to issue rules having the force of
law are not entitled to heightened deference if they avoid the procedural formalities. See id.
326. But cf. Mead, 533 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "Today's opinion makes an avulsive
change in judicial review of federal administrative action." Id. More recently, Justice Scalia has
referred to Mead as "our misguided opinion." Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation
Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2479 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
327. It is this interpretation of Mead that has led a number of scholars to refer to its influence in
"cabining" Chevron. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; e.g., Sunstein, supra note 7, at 193
(referring to Supreme Court efforts to "cabin" Chevron's reach); id. at 227 ("Mead is evidently
motivated by a concern that Chevron deference would ensure an insufficient safeguard against
agency decisions not preceded by formal procedures.").
328. Mead, 533 U.S. at 240 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Chevron presumed that when
Congress left an ambiguity in a statute, the agency charged with its implementation was intended
to resolve the ambiguity).
329. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840-41 (1984)
(citing 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (Oct. 14, 1981)); see also id. at 866 (endorsing "bubble" concept
incorporated in EPA's revised regulation issued in notice-and-comment proceedings).
330. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229.
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instance, Chevron deference is due.331
But what if an agency's interpretation is not entitled to Chevron deference
because Congress did not apparently expect the agency to "speak with the force
of law" when addressing statutory ambiguities? Mead acknowledged that
numerous agencies charged with implementing statutes, even if not authorized
to speak with the force of law, make "all sorts of interpretive choices [that]
certainly may influence courts facing questions the agencies have already
answered." 332
The fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has
been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the
degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness,
and to the persuasiveness of the agency's position. The approach has
produced a spectrum of judicial responses, from great respect at one end, to
near indifference at the other.
3 33
Thus, if Skidmore deference applies, the reviewing court will afford the
ruling "respect proportional to its 'power to persuade.' ' 334 However, the
burden of persuasion apparently rests with the agency to defend its
interpretation; if Skidmore applies, the agency lacks the benefit of the court's
doubt. In contrast, Chevron yields presumptive deference to the agency's
interpretation unless the challenger rebuts the presumption by convincing the
reviewing court that the statute unambiguously precludes the agency's reading
(Step One), that the agency's interpretation exceeds the scope of its lawful
authority (Step 1.5), or that the agency's interpretation is otherwise
unreasonable or impermissible (Step Two). 335
Notably, Justice Souter, writing for the Mead majority, apparently made a
conscious effort to reconcile the common law deference framework with the
judicial review provisions of the APA. 336 For example, the majority opinion
cited the relevant APA section when it observed that Chevron deference is due a
regulation that carries out an explicit delegation of authority. 337 More tellingly,
331. Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-46). The fact that this passage applies to both explicit and
implicit delegations suggests that Mead abandoned any distinction Chevron initially drew between
them. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44; supra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
332. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227.
333. Id. at 228.
334. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,140 (1944). "Such a ruling may surely claim the merit
of its writer's thoroughness, logic, and expertness, its fit with prior interpretations, and any other
sources of weight." Mead, 533 U.S. at 235.
335. In this sense, Chevron may be considered not only a standard of judicial review for agency
actions, but also a burden-shifting doctrine. Under Mead, the agency generally bears the initial
burden of persuasion that Congress meant its interpretations to have presumptively binding effect.
If the agency succeeds and the court applies Chevron, the agency's interpretation is presumptively
binding unless the opponent persuades the court that it is either impermissible, unreasonable, or
otherwise beyond the scope of the agency's lawful authority.
336. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227 & n.6.
337. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)). By integrating APA citations using carefully selected citation
signals, Justice Souter subtly acknowledged that the common law deference framework is difficult
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Justice Scalia's dissent openly acknowledged "some question" whether Chevron
had been "faithful" to the APA. 338 But he nevertheless went on to justify
Chevron as consistent with the "origins of federal-court judicial review," 339
which, of course, predated the APA.34°
D. Mead's Progeny
In a series of decisions issued after Christensen, the Rehnquist Court
sketched out the parameters of a new framework of judicial deference to the
various types of less formal administrative interpretations. In mapping out its
deference regime, or as Justice Scalia puts it, "administrative-law improvisation
project," 341 the Court identified several factors to consider in determining the
degree of deference due an informal agency interpretation. Two broad
categories overarch the others: first, the nature, scope, and clarity of the
legislative authority delegated to the agency; and second, the specific
rulemaking procedures the agency used and the format of the resulting
interpretation.342 Other persuasive but less influential factors include the
consistency of the agency's interpretation over time 343 and any prior judicial
interpretations of the statute. 344
The cumulative result of the Rehnquist Court's decisions is difficult to
characterize, 345 perhaps because the Court's deference framework continues to
evolve. Beginning with Mead, the Court mapped out two primary approaches
to square with the APA's express language. Id. at 229. Justice Scalia apparently agrees but less
subtly; in a recent keynote address, he conceded that the Court has "ignored" the APA's key
language. See Chevron Symposium, supra note 281.
338. Mead, 533 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In a footnote to his dissent, Scalia essentially
conceded that the plain language of 5 U.S.C. § 706 means that "all statutory ambiguities are to be
resolved judicially." Id. at 241 n.2 (citing Anthony, supra note 116, at 9-11). Somewhat grudgingly,
however, he went on to criticize the majority opinion for being "no more observant of the APA's
text than Chevron was-and indeed ... even more difficult to reconcile with it." Id. (emphasis added).
In a recent speech, Scalia openly acknowledged that the Court has ignored the APA directive that
reviewing courts are to resolve all issues of statutory interpretation. See Chevron Symposium, supra
note 281.
339. Mead, 533 U.S. at 241-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
340. See supra notes 85-113 and accompanying text (discussing pre-APA judicial deference
doctrines).
341. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1014 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
342. But cf. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1004 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[A] formal rulemaking proceeding
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for according Chevron deference to an agency's
interpretation of a statute."); Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-31 ("The want of" notice and comment "does not
decide the case.").
343. Cf., e.g., Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981. "Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to
analyze the agency's interpretation under the Chevron framework. Unexplained inconsistency is, at
most, a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency
practice under the [APA]." Id.
344. See, e.g., id. at 985 ("Before a judicial construction of a statute, whether contained in a
precedent or not, may trump an agency's, the court must hold that the statute unambiguously
requires the court's construction.").
345. "Difficult" puts it mildly. As several scholars have confirmed, "the Supreme Court's
deference jurisprudence is a mess." E.g., Eskridge & Baer, supra note 4, at 1157; see also Shane, supra
note 37, at 34 (referring to deference doctrine as "fraught with rhetorical confusion").
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to judicial deference that purport to be mutually exclusive: one based upon
Chevron and the other grounded in Skidmore.346 The Court's hyperfocus on
deciding the applicable deference framework regrettably obviates the more
important threshold issue that implicates constitutional concerns: Before a
reviewing court selects the applicable deference framework, the threshold
question must be whether the agency's interpretation is entitled to any judicial
deference at all. If not, which deference framework applies is a moot point.
1. Is the agency's interpretation worthy of any judicial deference?
If the reviewing court independently interprets the relevant statute in a
manner consistent with the agency's interpretation, "there is no occasion to
defer and no point in asking what kind of deference, or how much." 34 7 If the
statutory language is plain or if disputed language has a settled judicial
interpretation, then the court simply decides what the law is, and no deference
is due the agency's interpretation.
As a corollary, if the court's initial review reaches an interpretation contrary
to the agency's, it need not give the agency's interpretation any deference at all.
In that event, whether Chevron or Skidmore deference applies is irrelevant. For
example, if the reviewing court concludes after invoking traditional methods of
statutory interpretation 348 that the pertinent statute or rule is neither silent nor
ambiguous, the court's own interpretation becomes the controlling one and the
agency's contrary interpretation warrants no deference whatsoever. 349
To illustrate, in General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline,350 the
Rehnquist Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
did not protect relatively young employees against discrimination favoring
older employees, rejecting EEOC's contrary regulatory interpretation. 351
Interpreting the statute de novo, the Court concluded that it was
346. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 238 ("[Jludicial responses to administrative action must continue to
differentiate between Chevron and Skidmore .... "). Yet the two deference frameworks are not as
independent as the Court suggests. The Court's deference jurisprudence attempts to characterize
the degree of deference due by using its own precedents as pigeonholes. Instead, the Court should
devise a more abstract deference framework that bridges them all.
347. Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 n.8 (2002). In Edelman, a college professor
sued for discrimination after he was denied tenure. Id. at 109. The district court dismissed for his
failure to verify the EEOC charge until after the filing date. Id. at 110. An EEOC regulation,
however, allowed a charge to be amended for technical defects, with the amendments relating back
to the original filing date. Id. at 110 n.2. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, reasoning that
EEOC's interpretation in favor of the plaintiff was "unassailable," id. at 118, based upon
longstanding judicial precedent.
348. See, e.g., id. at 117 (relying on congressional acquiescence, a longstanding canon of statutory
construction).
349. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 585 (2000) (reading the statute "in the
context of the overall statutory scheme" to reach "the better reading"); see also id. at 592-96 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (finding the statute ambiguous but reaching the opposite interpretation); id. at 596
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (same).
350. 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
351. Id. at 584.
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unambiguous. 35 2 The majority reasoned that EEOC's admittedly long-standing
regulation 353 expressing a contrary interpretation was "clearly wrong."
354
Having reached that conclusion as a matter of judicial interpretation, the
majority correctly declined to address the degree of deference the regulation
otherwise might have been due.355
Echoing Chevron,356 the Court held that an agency's interpretation of a
statute is entitled to deference only if "the devices of judicial construction have
been tried and found to yield no clear sense of congressional intent."
35 7
Regardless of the ADEA's plain language favoring the plaintiffs' position, the
statute as judicially construed did not prohibit employer favoritism of older
workers at the expense of younger ones. 358 General Dynamics is a classic example
of traditional de novo review, which resolved the interpretive issue as a matter
of law based upon judicial precedent, without deference to the agency's
regulation.359
2. If the agency's interpretation warrants deference, which framework
applies?
If the reviewing court applies traditional tools of statutory interpretation
and concludes that the meaning of the statute remains in doubt, only then must
it decide which deference framework applies. In Mead, the majority carefully
distinguished Chevron from Skidmore deference, holding that Chevron applies
only when the authorizing statutes suggest that Congress would have expected
the agency to "speak with the force of law" when resolving statutory
ambiguities.36O An express delegation of authority to engage in formal
352. The Court relied on its own "consistent understanding that the text, structure, and history
point to the ADEA as a remedy for unfair preference based on relative youth, leaving complaints of
the relatively young outside the statutory concern." Id. at 593. Noting that the lower federal courts
had similarly interpreted the ADEA, the Court held that the strength of the judicial consensus, i.e.,
the settled judicial meaning, was "enough to rule out any serious claim of ambiguity, and
congressional silence after years of judicial interpretation supports adherence to the traditional
[judicial] view." Id. (footnote omitted).
353. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (2003). First adopted in 1981, the regulation had been carried forward
from a predecessor regulation adopted in 1968, the year after the ADEA was enacted. Gen.
Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 599 (2004) (citing 33 Fed. Reg. 9172 (1968)
(reprinting 29 C.F.R. § 860.91, rescinded by 46 Fed. Reg. 47,724 (1981)).
354. General Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 600.
355. Id.
356. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
357. General Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 600 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48
(1987)).
358. Id. Justice Scalia disagreed that the agency's interpretation was "clearly wrong." Id. at 601
(Scalia, J., dissenting). He noted that the statute did not unambiguously dictate an interpretation
other than EEOC's "authoritative conclusion," so it was entitled to deference. Id. at 602. In a
separate dissent, Justices Thomas and Kennedy accused the majority of "interpretive sleight of hand
to avoid addressing the plain language of the ADEA." Id. at 613 (Thomas, J., joined by Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
359. In Chevron terms, EEOC's interpretation was foreclosed at Step One because the statute was
rendered unambiguous by applying traditional tools of statutory interpretation.
360. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845).
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rulemaking or adjudication, while not a necessary prerequisite, 361 is "a very
good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment." 362 But the agency's
interpretation may nevertheless warrant "some deference" under Skidmore,
even if the delegated authority is merely implicit, if the procedure used was
relatively informal or the interpretation is otherwise "beyond the Chevron
pale." 363 The difficulty, of course, is figuring out the dividing lines between the
two deference frameworks and how each applies in a particular case.
E. Shrinking Chevron's Cabin
Of the two alternative deference frameworks, Chevron is unquestionably the
most deferential. If the reviewing court deems it applicable, Chevron deference
gives presumptive validity to the agency's view as long as it adopts a
"reasonable" or "permissible" interpretation 364 of the ambiguous statute or
legislative rule.
A year after deciding Mead, the Rehnquist Court applied its post-Mead
reformulation of Chevron deference in Barnhart v. Walton.365 The case involved
an application for disability benefits under the Social Security Act. The relevant
statute was ambiguous regarding whether a twelve-month duration
requirement for a work disability applied to the applicant's "inability to engage
in any substantial gainful activity" or only to his "impairment." 366 The agency
denied the application because the applicant had taken another job eleven
months after losing his teaching position due to a psychiatric disorder. 367 On
judicial review, he argued that his impairment exceeded the duration
requirement, even though he had returned to work within twelve months.3 68
But the regulation interpreted the statute to require the inability to work to last
twelve months, not just the impairment. 369
The Court first applied Auer 370 to the agency's interpretation of its own
regulation. 371  Next, the Court applied Chevron, presumably because the
regulation had been issued in notice-and-comment proceedings. Writing for
the majority, Justice Breyer rearticulated Chevron's two-step analysis but in a
negative image of the original: "Hence we must decide (1) whether the statute
unambiguously forbids the Agency's interpretation, and, if not, (2) whether the
361. Id.; see Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2002).
362. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229.
363. Id. at 234.
364. Id. at 229.
365. 535 U.S. 212 (2002) (8-1 opinion). Justice Scalia's concurring opinion also applied Chevron.
Id. at 226-27 (Scalia, J., concurring).
366. See id. at 214-15 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1994)).
367. Id. at 215.
368. Id. at 222-23.
369. Id. at 214-15; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b) (2001), quoted in Barnhart, 533 U.S. at 217.
370. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 217 ("Courts grant an agency's interpretation of its own regulations
considerable legal leeway.") (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Udall v. Tallman, 380
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965)).
371. Barnhart, 535 U.S at 217.
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interpretation, for other reasons, exceeds the bounds of the permissible." 372 As
reformulated, the Court's two-step analysis suggests that the burden of
persuasion is on the party seeking judicial review of the agency's interpretation,
which enjoys presumptive validity if Chevron applies.
Applying the framework, the majority first concluded that the Act did not
"unambiguously forbid the regulation." 373 While the statute itself did not
explicitly impose a duration requirement on the "inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity," other parts of the Act 374 suggested that a
"disability" required an impairment severe enough to preclude any work for at
least twelve months.3 75 The majority concluded that the agency's interpretation
was a "fair inference" from the ambiguous statutory language 376 and hence
permissible. 377
Finally, in a concise concluding paragraph, Justice Breyer enumerated
several factors summarizing the majority's reasons for applying Chevron:
In this case, the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise
of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute,
the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the
Agency has given the question over a long period of time all indicate that
Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through which to view the
legality of the Agency interpretation here at issue. 378
As the reader will note, all of these are similar to the persuasive factors
enumerated in Skidmore.379 Yet Justice Breyer invoked them to argue in favor of
applying the more deferential Chevron framework, suggesting that both
deference regimes are cut from the same cloth.
F. Reviving Skidmore
In contrast to Chevron deference, Mead / Skidmore is generally less likely to
result in judicial endorsement of the agency's interpretation. 380 Unlike Chevron,
372. Id. at 218 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843) (emphasis added). But cf. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-
43 (suggesting the agency has the burden of demonstrating that the statute is silent or ambiguous
and that its interpretation is permissible).
373. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 218.
374. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B) (1994).
375. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 218.
376. Id. at 219.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 222 (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 218).
379. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; supra note 100 and accompanying text (quoting Skidmore's
enumerated factors). Although Justice Scalia concurred with the majority in nearly all respects, he
disagreed with its reliance on the longstanding nature of the Social Security Administration's
interpretation. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 226 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia would have held that
the agency's interpretation warranted Chevron deference simply because it had "emerged from
notice-and-comment rulemaking." Id. at 227.
380. But see SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819-20 (2002) (Stevens, J.) (unanimous decision)
(relying on Mead in upholding a formal SEC adjudication of civil fraud based on SEC's consistently
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all that Skidmore and Mead guarantee is that the court will give the agency's
interpretation some consideration.381 Just how much depends upon a host of
factors, some of which appear to overlap with the very factors that trigger
Chevron deference. 382 As Mead noted, the Skidmore "approach has produced a
spectrum of judicial responses," 383 depending upon the agency's thoroughness,
reasoning, consistency, and other persuasive factors. 384
The Rehnquist Court applied the Mead/ Skidmore sliding-scale standard in
Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells. 385 A bookkeeper claimed
that a professional corporation had discharged her on the basis of disability. 386
Plaintiff's claim turned on whether four physicians who were shareholder-
directors could be considered "employees" 387 under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA),3 88 which defines "employee" as "an individual
employed by an employer." 389 Finding the ADA definition unhelpful, 390 the
Court turned to its own precedents construing similar language in other
statutes, which had generally relied on the common law meaning.3 91 Indeed,
the Court reasoned, "[C]ongressional silence often reflects an expectation that
courts will look to the common law to fill gaps in statutory text, particularly
when an undefined term has a settled meaning at common law." 392
broad reading, which was entitled to deference if reasonable).
381. See, e.g., Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C., v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 18, 20-21 (2004) (advisory
opinion entitled to "respectful consideration" under Skidmore); Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs.
v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 496-97 (2002) (opinion letter, policy statement, and proposed regulation
"warrant[] respectful consideration").
382. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 228.
383. Id.
384. Id. (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). Justice Scalia continues to colorfully express his
disdain for Skidmore. At a recent symposium commemorating the 25th Anniversary of Chevron, he
responded to a student whose question suggested the continuing need for Skidmore deference:
I would eliminate Skidmore deference. Skidmore deference is a farce! Skidmore deference
is-you give it as much value as you think it's worth. Give it as much value as you
would give a law review article. I mean, you know, of course you take into account
who it was that's the author of that article, but still in all, it's moosh! And, you know
what's good about it? What's good about Skidmore deference and what's good about
the new rule is precisely that it's a good 'ol totality of the circumstances rule, which
means basically the court can do whatever it wants! Case by case-there are no rules.
Whatever seems like a good result here. It is empowering-it is empowering of the
courts. So, far from thinking that this is something that is going to enable you to lessen
the impact of the agencies, I think it's just the opposite. I don't believe in Skidmore
deference. It's either Chevron or-you know, Chevron or the road!
Chevron Symposium, supra note 281.
385. 538 U.S. 440 (2003).
386. Id. at 442.
387. Id.
388. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
389. Wells, 538 U.S. at 444 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2000)).
390. "A definition must not contain, directly or indirectly, the term being defined." REED
DICKERSON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFnNG § 8.1, at 93 (1954).
391. Wells, 538 U.S. at 445 (relying upon, inter alia, Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S.
318, 322-23 (1992)).
392. Id. at 447 (citing Darden, 503 U.S. at 324-25).
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The Court next considered the interpretive guidelines in EEOC's
Compliance Manual, conceding they were not "controlling" under Chevron.393
The Court expressly invoked Skidmore, observing that EEOC had been granted
"special enforcement responsibilities under the ADA" and other statutes with
similar employment thresholds. 394 The Court was persuaded by the EEOC
guidelines' reliance on six factors grounded in "the common law touchstone of
control." 395 Ultimately, the Court endorsed EEOC's guidelines for defining an
"employee" as persuasive, while not binding.3 96
The Rehnquist Court's application of the reinvigorated Skidmore doctrine
reflects the strong influence common law meanings continue to play in
administrative law. Wells also illustrates the Court's ongoing struggle to strike
the appropriate balance as it sorts out the relative influence of Congress, the
executive branch, and the courts in determining the proper scope of judicial
review.
G. Unravelling Stare Decisis:
Do Agency Interpretations Trump Statutory Precedent?
One of the last cases decided by the Rehnquist Court, National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services,397 addressed whether a
prior judicial interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term controls over a
subsequent contrary interpretation by the agency charged with enforcing the
statute. 398 Authored by Justice Thomas, the 6-3 decision clarified the Rehnquist
Court's deference doctrine in several respects. In particular, the Court applied
Chevron as a basis for yielding to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous
statutory term, even in light of a prior circuit court opinion reaching a contrary
interpretation. 399
Brand X was an appeal from a Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
formal rulemaking proceeding. 40 0 The FCC had ruled that broadband internet
service did not qualify as "telecommunications service" if provided by cable
companies, which therefore were not subject to FCC regulation. 40 1 On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit, relying on its own precedent to the contrary,40 2 vacated the
393. Id. at 449 & n.9.
394. Id. at 448.
395. Id. at 449-50.
396. Id. at 449 & n.9, 451.
397. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
398. See id. at 982.
399. Id. at 982-83.
400. Id. at 977, 979.
401. Id. at 977-78 (citing In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable
and Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4821-22 (2002)). A Ninth Circuit panel had previously held in
an unrelated Oregon case that cable modem service qualified as a "telecommunications service."
See AT&T Corp. v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 2000). The question in Brand X was whether
the decision had binding precedential effect on the FCC's subsequent rulemaking process.
402. See AT&T Corp., 216 F.3d at 880.
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FCC's decision. 40 3
The Supreme Court reversed.40 4 In a carefully reasoned decision, Justice
Thomas, writing for the majority, reviewed the legislative history of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the history of the FCC's proceeding. 40 5
Without doubt, the FCC had been delegated authority to enforce the Act and to
issue binding implementing rules.406 Further, the FCC's interpretation carried
out its statutory authority 407 and was the product of formal rulemaking. 408 The
FCC ruling thus met all prerequisites for Chevron deference. 40 9
The Court next addressed whether the Ninth Circuit precedent trumped the
FCC's subsequent interpretation favoring the cable companies. 410 Justice
Thomas openly acknowledged the "genuine confusion in the lower courts over
the interaction between the Chevron doctrine and stare decisis principles." 4 11 He
noted that the Ninth Circuit's precedent had not concluded that the key
statutory language was unambiguous, 412 nor that its interpretation was the
only permissible reading.413 Rather, the opinion had concluded only that the
best interpretation of the Act suggested that cable broadband providers did not
provide "telecommunications service." 414
The majority underscored Chevron's presumptive deference to the agency's
resolution of a statutory ambiguity. 4 15 Justice Thomas concluded,
The better rule is to hold judicial interpretations contained in precedents to
the same demanding Chevron step one standard that applies if the court is
reviewing the agency's construction on a blank slate: Only a judicial
precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency's
interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a
conflicting agency construction. 416
In other words, unless a court concludes that Congress has spoken
403. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d, 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom., 545 U.S.
967 (2005).
404. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1003.
405. Id. at 975-79.
406. See id. at 980-81; see also 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (creating the FCC).
407. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981.
408. Id. at 977-78.
409. See id. at 982. The Court disregarded the argument that the FCC's interpretation was
"inconsistent with its past practice," reasoning that agency inconsistency does not defeat Chevron
deference as long as (1) the statute is ambiguous and (2) the agency "adequately explains the
reasons" for reversing course. Id. at 981; see id. at 1001 & n.4. In this case, the FCC adequately
defended its decision based on changing market conditions, including rapidly expanding access to
internet service that justified minimal regulation of broadband. Id. at 1001.
410. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982-86.
411. Id. at 985.
412. Id. at 982 (citing 345 F.2d at 1131).
413. Id. at 984.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 982.
416. Id. at 982-83.
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unambiguously on the issue, even a judicial interpretation must yield to the
agency's later interpretation if (1) entitled to Chevron deference, and (2) within
the range of permissible interpretations from which the agency has authority to
select.417
In light of Mead and Christensen, Brand X left open how the Court would
have resolved the matter had the FCC interpretation not warranted Chevron
deference. For example, in the absence of notice-and-comment rulemaking, is
an agency bound by a prior judicial interpretation of an ambiguous statute? If a
federal district court or a state court holds that a statute is unambiguous, must
an agency treat that judicial interpretation as binding, even in a notice-and-
comment rulemaking? Moreover, how should a federal district court or state
court choose between (1) a federal circuit's otherwise binding interpretation of
an ambiguous federal statute, and (2) an inconsistent regulation later adopted
by the agency charged with enforcing it?
Perhaps not surprisingly, Brand X, the Rehnquist Court's last word on
judicial deference, raised more questions than it answered. However, Brand X
underscored the critical nature of the threshold question in deference
jurisprudence: whether the statutory language is ambiguous.
IV. THE ROBERTS COURTS AMORPHOUS JUDICIAL REVIEW FRAMEWORK
As we have seen, by the end of the October 2004 Term, the Rehnquist Court
had firmly reestablished Skidmore alongside Chevron as the two primary
doctrines of judicial deference. 418 At the end of the term, Justice O'Connor
unexpectedly resigned.419 Less than two months later, cancer claimed the life
of Chief Justice Rehnquist. 4 20 President George W. Bush initially appointed
John Roberts, Jr. to replace Justice O'Connor,421 but later designated him Chief
Justice to replace the late Rehnquist. 4 22 Roberts was confirmed just in time to
open the Court's October 2005 Term. 423
417. Justice Stevens concurred, hinting that the majority's reasoning might not apply if the
Supreme Court had issued the statutory precedent, which "would presumably remove any pre-
existing ambiguity." Id. at 1003 (Stevens, J., concurring). But see Hemandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547
F.3d 1237, 1251 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that an agency may interpret a statute differently than even
the Supreme Court has previously construed it to avoid constitutional doubts, as long as the
agency's later interpretation is "reasonable and avoids serious constitutional questions"), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009).
418. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 238; see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538
U.S. 440, 449 & n.9 (2003) (declining Chevron deference but applying Skidmore factors to EEOC
Compliance Manual).
419. William Branigin, Fred Barbash & Daniela Deane, Supreme Court Justice O'Connor Resigns,
WASH. POST, July 1, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-yn/content/article/2005/07/01/
AR2005070100653.html.
420. Charles Lane, Chief Justice Dies at Age 80, WAsH. POST, Sept. 4, 2005, at Al.
421. Bush Nominates Roberts to Supreme Court, CNN.CoM, July 20, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLM1CS/07/19/scotus.main/index.html.
422. Roberts Sworn in as Chief Justice, CNN.coM, Sept. 29, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/29/roberts.nomination/index.html.
423. See Charles Babington & Peter Baker, Roberts Confirmed as 17th Chief Justice, WASH. POST,
Sept. 30, 2005, at Al.
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In the meantime, Justice O'Connor had agreed to remain on the Court until
her successor was nominated and confirmed. 4 24 During the transition, Justice
O'Connor participated in Gonzales v. Oregon,425 voting with the majority. 426
Just two weeks later, Justice Samuel Alito, Jr. was confirmed and took Justice
O'Connor's seat.4
27
A. Gonzales v. Oregon
On the morning of his third day on the Supreme Court,428 Chief Justice
Roberts opened oral arguments in the case of Gonzales v. Oregon.429 The
decision in that case would set the course for a divided Roberts Court on issues
involving judicial deference to administrative interpretations of law.
The dispute arose after Attorney General John Ashcroft issued an
interpretive ruling 430 concluding that physician-assisted suicide was not a
"legitimate medical purpose" as defined by the Controlled Substances Act.431
Its purpose and effect was to preempt the State of Oregon's Death with Dignity
Act, 43 2 which authorizes registered physicians to lawfully prescribe lethal doses
of controlled substances at the request of terminally ill patients under strictly
limited circumstances. 43 3 Moreover, the ruling put Oregon physicians at risk of
federal criminal prosecution for actions otherwise consistent with state law.4 34
The State of Oregon, joined by several terminally ill patients and others,
secured an injunction blocking enforcement, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.435
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Attorney General
424. O'Connor Resignation Letter, CNN.cOM, July 1, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/07/01/oconnor.letter.nobanner/.
425. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
426. Id. at 247 (6-3 opinion).
427. David Welna, All Things Considered: Alito Confirmed as Newest Supreme Court Justice, NAT'L
PUB. RADIO, Jan. 31, 2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5181091;
Charles Babington, Alito Is Sworn In On High Court, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2006, at Al.
428. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, 3, Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (No. 04-623).
429. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
430. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607, 56,608 (Nov. 9,
2001).
431. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2006). Ashcroft's ruling expressly reversed an earlier one issued by
then-Attorney General Janet Reno. See Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Sen. Orrin
Hatch, on Oregon's Death with Dignity Act (June 5, 1998), reprinted in S. REP. No. 105-372, at 9-10
n.10 (1999).
432. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.995 (2007). Oregon voters had twice approved the Death
with Dignity Act. The citizens' initiative was first approved by a slim margin in the 1994 general
election. An injunction delayed its implementation until late 1997. In the meantime, Oregon voters
defeated a second ballot measure that would have repealed the Act. See OFFICE OF DISEASE
PREVENTION & EPIDEMIOLOGY, OR. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERvs., EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT ON OREGON'S
DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACr 6 (2006), available at
http://egov.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/docs/year8.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
433. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.995.
434. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006) (imposing criminal penalties for knowingly or intentionally
dispensing controlled substances without a valid prescription).
435. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Or. 2002), affd, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004),
affd sub nom. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
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had permissibly interpreted the Controlled Substances Act and the
implementing regulations of the Department of Justice.43 6
A solid majority of the Court affirmed, barring enforcement of the
interpretive ruling. 437 The opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, rejected the
Attorney General's argument that the ruling was entitled to Auer deference,
reasoning that the regulation merely "parroted" the relevant statutory terms and
therefore did not interpret ambiguous regulations. 438  Nor did Chevron
deference apply because the ruling exceeded the Attorney General's limited
rulemaking authority under the Controlled Substances Act. 439 In short, the
ruling failed to pass muster under Chevron Step 1.5.440
Having concluded that both Auer and Chevron were inapplicable, the Court
held that the ruling was entitled to "deference only in accordance with
Skidmore."44 1 Applying the Skidmore factors, 442 the Court concluded that the
interpretive ruling was unpersuasive. 443 In particular, the majority expressed
concern about the ruling's preemptive effect. 444
Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Justice Thomas 445 and Chief Justice
Roberts. 446 They rejected the majority's reasoning that Auer did not apply,
arguing that no authority existed for the "parroting" exception. 447  The
dissenters also reasoned that the Attorney General's interpretation was correct,
even applying de novo review.448 Finally, they took issue with the majority's
conclusion that Chevron did not apply on the ground that the interpretive ruling
exceeded the Attorney General's authority. 449
Gonzales v. Oregon is notable for curtailing the reach of Auer and its
predecessor, Seminole Rock. The Government argued that the interpretive ruling
was entitled to substantial deference under Auer because it was simply an
administrative interpretation of the agency's own ambiguous regulation, 450 and
436. Gonzales v. Oregon, 543 U.S. 1145 (2005).
437. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 275 (6-3 decision).
438. Id. at 257.
439. See id. at 258-68.
440. See supra notes 232-41 and accompanying text.
441. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 268.
442. Id. at 268-69.
443. Id. at 269.
444. Id. at 274. Justice Kennedy disclaimed reliance on "clear statement requirements ... or
presumptions against pre-emption ... to reach this commonsense conclusion." Id. Otherwise, the
dispositive portion of the majority's holding suggests traditional de novo review consistent with 5
U.S.C. § 706. Ironically, however, the Court never once cited § 706 in its opinion.
445. Justice Thomas also filed his own dissent. Id. at 299 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
446. Id. at 275 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The fact that the opinion drew the Chief Justice's first
dissenting vote is particularly significant because the Roberts Court was noted for unanimity
during its initial term. See Bill Mears, Consensus is Roberts' Rule of Order, CNN.coM, June 2, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/06/02/roberts.rules/index.html.
447. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 275, 277-85.
448. Id. at 276, 285-92.
449. Id. at 276, 292-97.
450. See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 (2009) (requiring all prescriptions to be issued "for a legitimate
medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional
practice").
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the dissenters agreed.451 The majority rejected that argument, refusing to
extend Auer super-deference to a regulation that merely restated or "parroted"
the disputed statutory terms. 45 2  The majority's reasoning signaled its
awareness that the lenient deference standard announced in Auer for informal
interpretations of an agency's own ambiguous regulations may be readily
exploited and is difficult to reconcile with Mead's more constrained deference
doctrine.
B. Rapanos v. United States
Shortly after Justice Alito was confirmed, the Court again addressed an
issue of administrative interpretation in Rapanos v. United States.453 A four-
justice plurality rejected the agency's regulation as inconsistent with the
statute's plain language. 454 Justice Kennedy concurred based on entirely
different reasoning. 455 Justice Stevens authored a dissent, joined by three other
justices, that would have deferred to the agency's longstanding regulation. 456
The dispute involved dredging permits issued by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (Corps). The question was whether the Corps had jurisdiction to
require permits for wetlands adjacent to navigable waters. 457 The Clean Water
Act 458 defines "navigable waters" to mean "waters of the United States." 459 A
longstanding Corps regulation had defined the term to include not only
navigable waters in the traditional sense, but also tributaries and adjacent
wetlands. 460 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the
petitioners' wetlands qualified as "waters of the United States" under the Clean
Water Act. 461 If so, the Corps had jurisdiction to regulate dredging on the
petitioners' property.
Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, concluded that the Corps' regulation
451. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 277.
452. Id. at 257 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 830(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2006) ("issued for a legitimate medical
purpose"); 21 U.S.C. § 802(21) (2006) ("in the course of professional practice")). Note the anomaly
that otherwise would have resulted had the majority not recognized the "parroting" exception.
Auer declined to require an agency to apply canons of statutory construction to resolve regulatory
ambiguities. See supra notes 279-81 and accompanying text. Had the Gonzales Court granted Auer
deference, it would have simply deferred to the agency's interpretation of ambiguous statutory
terms, thus insulating the Court from its own interpretive responsibility under Chevron Step One.
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
453. 547 U.S. 715 (2006). The case was argued on February 21, 2006, just three weeks after Justice
Alito was confirmed.
454. See id. at 739 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
455. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
456. Id. at 796-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts added a separate concurring
opinion, id. at 757 (Roberts, C.J., concurring), and Justice Breyer added a separate dissent, id. at 811
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
457. Id. at 764 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
458. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
459. Id. § 1362(7) (defining "navigable waters").
460. 33 C.F.R. §§ 328.3(a)(1), (5), (7) (2008); see also Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 724.
461. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 730.
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was impermissibly broad.4 62 In reaching that conclusion, he focused on the
isolated term "waters." 463 While not ambiguous standing alone, the Court's
precedents had acknowledged the "inherent ambiguity in drawing the
boundaries of any 'waters"' 464 because the Corps must decide at what point
"water ends and land begins." 465
After consulting a dictionary, Justice Scalia concluded that the only
"plausible" interpretation limited the term to "relatively permanent, standing
or continuously flowing bodies of water... that are described in ordinary
parlance as 'streams[,... oceans, rivers, [and] lakes[,]' 466 not including
"channels through which water flows intermittently or ephemerally, or
channels that periodically provide drainage for rainfall." 467 Although Justice
Scalia expressly concluded that the Corps' interpretation was impermissible
(Chevron Step Two), the plurality's reasoning suggested instead that the
regulations failed Step One because Congress had unambiguously limited the
Corps' jurisdiction to "waters" in the narrow sense.468
Justice Kennedy concurred based on entirely different reasoning. He
primarily relied on two Supreme Court precedents interpreting the same
statutory language. In the first, the Court had unanimously upheld the Corps'
regulation interpreting "waters of the United States" to include adjacent
wetlands.469 In the second, the Court had held that a pond located in a former
sand and gravel pit, neither adjacent nor connected to any navigable water, was
beyond the Corps' jurisdiction. 470 Synthesizing these precedents, Kennedy
concluded that "waters of the United States" require a "significant nexus" with
navigable water to fall within the Corps' jurisdiction. 471 Rejecting the
plurality's interpretation as too narrow,4 72 Justice Kennedy nevertheless
concluded that "[a]bsent more specific regulations... the Corps must establish
a significant nexus on a case-by-case basis when it seeks to regulate wetlands
based on adjacency to nonnavigable tributaries." 473
Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. 4 74 Applying Chevron, they concluded that the regulation was "a
462. Id. at 737.
463. Id. at 740-41.
464. Id. at 740 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985)).
465. Id. (quoting Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 132).
466. Id. at 739 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2882 (2d ed. 1954)).
467. Id.
468. See id. at 725. Once again, Justice Scalia conflated the Chevron steps by concluding that the
Corps' interpretation was not permissible. If, as the plurality reasoned, the plain meaning of
"waters" precluded any other interpretation, it was unnecessary to decide whether the Corps'
interpretation was permissible.
469. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 135.
470. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 171-74
(2001).
471. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 767 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
472. Id. at 776-77.
473. Id. at 782.
474. Id. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting). All four Rapanos dissenters had joined the majority
opinion in Gonzales v. Oregon, while three justices in the Rapanos plurality had joined the former
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quintessential example of the Executive's reasonable interpretation of a
statutory provision." 475  The dissent criticized the plurality's "revisionist
reading" 476 as inconsistent with the Court's unanimous precedent holding the
identical regulation permissible. 477
Rapanos illustrates the complexity and confusion that characterize the
Court's evolving deference jurisprudence. The deeply divided Court took three
distinctly different approaches in interpreting the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction
under the Clean Water Act. Justice Scalia adopted a strict textualist approach,
reasoning that unambiguous statutory language precluded the Corps'
expansive interpretation. 4 78  The dissenters reached exactly the opposite
conclusion, relying on post-Chevron deference jurisprudence to conclude that
the agency's interpretation was reasonable. 479 Finally, Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion rejected both the plurality's narrow interpretation and the
dissent's highly deferential one, instead adopting a strictly common law
analysis based on factually analogous precedents. 480
One might wonder how the courts below addressed the case on remand
without any clear mandate from a majority. 481 Moreover, when the Supreme
Court itself is so seriously divided on how to apply its administrative deference
doctrine, it should be no surprise when district and circuit courts reach different
conclusions on the same or similar questions.482
C. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke
One year after its badly divided decision in Rapanos, the Court reached a
unanimous decision in Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke.483 The case
involved a Department of Labor regulation interpreting a provision in the FLSA
pertaining to domestic companion services. Justice Breyer, writing for the
dissent. The two cases illustrate why the Court's deference decisions are so inconsistent-a shifting
majority (or plurality) means that the Court's administrative deference decisions are virtually
impossible to reconcile.
475. Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
476. Id. at 793.
477. Id. (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985)).
478. See id. at 733-34, 737-38 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). Justice Scalia is well known as the
Court's most strident textualist. Paul Killebrew, Mhere Are All the Left-Wing Textualists?, 82 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1895, 1896 (2007). "Textualism" is a plain-language methodology for interpreting statutes,
commonly associated with Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit. Id.
479. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 788, 796-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
480. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Consistent with the theme of his concurring opinion,
Justice Kennedy has been called by one scholar a "judicial supremacist" and "the Court's most
vocal defender of judicial power." Jeffrey Rosen, The Roberts Court & Executive Power, 35 PEPP. L.
REV. 503, 508 (2008). By relying on the Court's own precedents to synthesize a required "nexus"
between wetlands and other waters, Justice Kennedy subjugated the Court's common law deference
regimes to classic analogous reasoning.
481. The uncertainty in the wake of Rapanos has complicated enforcement of the Clean Water
Act. See, e.g., EPA Staff Describe Drain on Resources of Enforcing Clean Water Act After Rapanos, 77
U.S.L.W. 2684, 2684-85 (May 12, 2009).
482. For one recent example of a badly split three-judge panel, see Creekstone Farms Premium Beef,
L.L.C. v. Dep't of Agric., 539 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (2-1 opinion).
483. 551 U.S. 158, 161 (2007).
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Court, addressed a number of interrelated deference questions involving an
unambiguous statute, conflicting regulations, and an advisory memorandum.
Evelyn Coke, a former employee of Long Island Care at Home (Long Island
Care), had provided domestic companion services to its clients. 484 She sued for
minimum wages and overtime pay. 485 The FLSA exempts "any employee
employed in domestic service employment to provide companionship services for
individuals who.., are unable to care for themselves (as such terms are defined
and delimited by regulations of the Secretary [of Labor])." 4 86 The Department's
"General Regulations," however, define "domestic service employment" as
"services of a household nature performed by an employee in or about a private
home... of the person by whom he or she is employed." 487 Coke argued that this
regulation controlled. Long Island Care, however, cited an "Interpretation,"
which specifically exempts domestic companion workers "who are employed
by an employer or agency other than the family or household using their
services ... ."488 The issue was whether the "domestic service employment"
exemption applied to domestic companion workers employed by third-party
agencies like Long Island Care. 489
The Court first noted that the FLSA specifically authorized the Secretary of
Labor to issue implementing rules and regulations. 490  Next, the Court
acknowledged the agency's expertise in employment matters and that the
dispute involved an "interstitial" 491 issue that Congress had delegated to the
agency. 492 Further, the agency had issued its interpretive regulations in a
notice-and-comment proceeding. 493  Citing the Department's broad
"definitional authority," the Court held it was for the agency to answer such
questions.494
Acknowledging that the agency's regulations were inconsistent, 495 the
Court concluded that the "Interpretation" controlled, in part because it was
484. Id. at 164.
485. Id.
486. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (2006) (emphasis added), quoted in Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. at
161-62.
487. 29 C.F.R. § 552.3 (2009) (emphasis added), quoted in Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. at 163.
488. 29 C.F.R. § 552.109(a) (2009) (emphasis added), quoted in Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. at
163.
489. Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. at 164. The Supreme.Court had previously vacated the
Second Circuit's decision and remanded for consideration of the Department of Labor's Advisory
Memorandum, issued while the litigation was pending. Id.; see Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v.
Coke, 546 U.S. 1147 (2006). On remand, the Second Circuit was not persuaded by the Advisory
Memorandum and once again held the "Interpretation" unenforceable. See Coke v. Long Island
Care at Home, Ltd., 462 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 2006), rev'd, 551 U.S. 158 (2007). Thereafter, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 549 U.S. 1105 (2007).
490. Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. at 165.
491. The Court explained in passing that an "interstitial" matter is "a portion of a broader
definition." Id.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Id. at 168. This is a classic application of Chevron Step 1.5. See supra notes 232-41 and
accompanying text.
495. Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. at 168-69.
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more specific than the conflicting "General Regulation" -its sole purpose was
to clarify that the exemption applied to domestic companion employees of
third-party agencies. 496 Next, the Court addressed the Secretary's Advisory
Memorandum issued in response to the Coke litigation. Analogizing it to a
legal brief, the Court applied Auer in concluding that the agency's
interpretation controlled unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation. 497
Coke urged that the "Interpretation" was entitled only to Skidmore
deference to the extent persuasive. 498 The Court disagreed, emphasizing that it
had been the product of a notice-and-comment proceeding, even though not
required for interpretive rules. 499 Further, the challenged regulation had been
treated as binding for some thirty years 500 and was thus longstanding and
consistently applied, both hallmarks of judicial deference.
Finally, the Court observed that "the ultimate question" was whether
Congress would have expected a reviewing court to treat the agency action as
within its delegated authority: 50 1
Where an agency rule sets forth important individual rights and duties,
where the agency focuses fully and directly upon the issue, where the agency
uses full notice-and-comment procedures to promulgate a rule, where the
resulting rule falls within the statutory grant of authority, and where the rule
itself is reasonable, then a court ordinarily assumes that Congress intended it
to defer to the agency's determination.502
In short, the Court deferred to the Secretary's Advisory Memorandum-even
though it had been prepared in anticipation of litigation -and held that the
agency's interpretation of its inconsistent regulations was controlling. 503
In the wake of Rapanos, it was as if the Court took pains to demonstrate that
it continued to embrace Chevron and Auer, as well as the more flexible Skidmore
factors revived by Mead. The unanimous decision relied on a merged deference
doctrine incorporating Chevron criteria as well as Mead/Skidmore factors.504
Acknowledging Skidmore's applicability to interpretive rules, the Court
496. Id. at 170.
497. Id. at 171. Note that Justice Breyer did not explicitly refer to the regulations as
"ambiguous," an important criterion for Auer deference. Tacitly, the Court reasoned that it was a
sufficient ambiguity that there were two conflicting agency regulations. See Transcript of Oral
Argument at 35-36, Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. 158 (No. 06-593) (transcribing colloquy
between Justice Scalia and counsel for the respondent on whether contradictory regulations amount
to ambiguity).
498. Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. at 171-72.
499. Id. at 173 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2006)).
500. Id.
501. Id. at 173.
502. Id. at 173-74 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-33 (2001)).
503. Id. at 171, 174.
504. Id. at 165 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984) and Mead, 533 U.S. at 227); id. at 173-74 (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-33) (enumerating
"factors" favoring judicial deference).
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nevertheless declined to apply it, in part because the disputed rule had been
issued in a notice-and-comment proceeding. 50 5 While not necessary to reach
the Court's result, Justice Breyer also deferred to the Secretary's Advisory
Memorandum because it interpreted the agency's own regulations and thus
warranted Auer deference.5
0 6
The Court's reasoning in Long Island Care at Home implicitly suggested that
inconsistent agency regulations amount to regulatory ambiguity that the agency
is best equipped to resolve. However, its reasoning disregarded the
unambiguous language of the statute itself, which clearly exempts "any
employee employed in domestic service employment to provide companionship
services... ."507 While neither regulation directly contradicted the statutory
language, the more specific regulation, to which the Court ultimately deferred,
was more consistent with the statute's plain language than the definitional
regulation on which Coke relied.
But the Court could have resolved the dispute and reached the same result
at Chevron Step One simply by interpreting the relevant statutory language.
Instead, it relied on strained reasoning to declare an "ambiguity" based on
inconsistent regulations, each of which was unambiguous standing alone. As
we will see next, the implicit reasoning in Long Island Care at Home would soon
become the basis of a more far-reaching decision, which declared an ambiguity
based on two apparently inconsistent statutes that the majority refused to
reconcile. 508
D. National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife
The apparent unanimity of the Roberts Court on issues of administrative
deference would not last long. Just two weeks after issuing Long Island Care at
Home, a deeply divided Court decided National Ass'n of Home Builders v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 509 which addressed an apparent conflict between the Clean
Water Act and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). 510 Justice Alito authored the
majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts as well as Justices Scalia and
Thomas. 511  Justice Stevens wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. 512 Justice Kennedy, once again the swing vote, joined
the conservative majority to decide the outcome.513
The dispute involved the EPA's transfer of authority to the State of Arizona
505. Id. at 173. The Court once again signaled its preference for notice-and-comment procedures.
506. Id. at 171 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)).
507. See id. at 162 (emphasis added) (quoting Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 13, 29 U.S.C. §
213(a)(15) (2006)).
508. See, e.g., Frost v. Wenie, 157 U.S. 46, 58 (1895) (" [W]here two statutes cover, in whole or in
part, the same matter, and are not absolutely irreconcilable, the duty of the court-no purpose to
repeal being clearly expressed or indicated-is, if possible, to give effect to both.").
509. 551 U.S. 644 (2007) (5-4 opinion).
510. Id. at 649.
511. Id. at 647.
512. Id. at 673 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
513. See id. at 647 (majority opinion).
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to issue permits under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES),514 a cooperative regulatory process designed to mitigate water
pollution, as required by the Clean Water Act. 515 The EPA administers the
program, but a state may seek transfer of permit authority with continuing EPA
oversight. 516 The Clean Water Act specifies nine criteria for transfer of EPA's
permit authority, all relating to whether state law gives state officials necessary
oversight authority. 517 If all nine criteria are met, the EPA must approve the
requested transfer. 518
In apparent conflict is section 7(a)(2) of the ESA, 519 which requires federal
agencies, before taking any proposed action, to consult with Fish and Wildlife
Services (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to avoid
jeopardizing endangered species.520 As the statute requires, the EPA had
consulted with FWS, which initially expressed concern about the potentially
indirect adverse impact if the transfer should result in the issuance of more
discharge permits and therefore more development. 5 21 Ultimately, however,
FWS concluded that the EPA's continuing oversight would sufficiently protect
endangered species. 522
Defenders of Wildlife and other environmental groups sought judicial
review. 523 The Ninth Circuit vacated the transfer, reasoning that section 7(a)(2)
in effect added a tenth prerequisite to the nine enumerated in the Clean Water
Act for transfer of permit authority 524 and that the EPA's transfer decision was
arbitrary and capricious.525
The Supreme Court reversed. 526 Quoting directly from Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 5 27 Justice
Alito, writing for the majority, described arbitrary and capricious review as
deferential in nature. 528 That the relevant federal agencies had changed their
minds during the consultation process was irrelevant as long as they had
followed proper procedures.529 Turning to the merits, the majority
514. Id. at 649-50.
515. Id. at 650.
516. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(b), 1342 (2006)).
517. Id. at 650-51 & n.2 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)-(9)) (listing the nine prerequisites for the
transfer of permit authority to a state).
518. Id. at 651.
519. See Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2006).
520. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 649, 652 (quoting ESA § 7(a)(2)).
521. Id. at 653.
522. Id. at 654.
523. Id. at 655. The statute allows private parties to petition for judicial review of EPA
determinations concerning state permit programs. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(D) (2006)).
524. Id. at 656 (citing Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946, 965 (9th Cir. 2005)).
525. Id. at 655 (citing Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 420 F.3d at 959); see also id. at 656-57.
526. Id. at 657.
527. 463 U.S. 29 (1983); see supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text (discussing State Farm).
528. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 658.
529. Id. at 659 ("[Flederal courts ordinarily are empowered to review only an agency's final
action, see 5 U.S.C. § 704 [(2006)], and the fact that a preliminary determination by a local agency
representative is later overruled at a higher level within the agency does not render the decision-
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acknowledged that it was required to "mediate a clash of seemingly
categorical - and, at first glance, irreconcilable - legislative commands." 530 But
Justice Alito worried that a broad reading of section 7(a)(2) would have the
effect of partially trumping every other federal statute calling for agency action,
contrary to the Court's longstanding "presumption against implied repeals." 
531
Allegedly to resolve the "tension" between the statutes, FWS and the NMFS
had issued a joint regulation after notice-and-comment proceedings.532 The
regulation simply stated that section 7 of the ESA applied to discretionary
federal actions.533 The questions on certiorari were whether the regulation
lawfully interpreted section 7 and, if so, whether the EPA acted lawfully in
transferring its permit authority to the State of Arizona.
Reciting Chevron's two-step test, 534 Justice Alito hypothesized an ambiguity
in the ESA that its language simply does not illuminate. Recognizing implicitly
that Chevron deference does not apply in the absence of an ambiguity, 535 Justice
Alito recited a traditional tool of statutory construction: "[TIhe words of a
statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme." 536  From there, Justice Alito read the otherwise
unambiguous, mandatory language of section 7(a)(2) not just in the context of
the ESA, but rather "against the statutory backdrop of the many mandatory
agency directives whose operation it would implicitly abrogate or repeal if it
were construed ... broadly . .."537 In other words, the majority considered the
ESA's interpretive context to be virtually unlimited.
Having fabricated a statutory ambiguity out of whole cloth, Justice Alito
next deferred to the implementing agencies' "expert interpretation" that
appeared to confine the reach of section 7(a)(2) to discretionary agency actions,
thus "harmoniz[ing] the statutes." 538 Justice Alito concluded that the agencies'
interpretation was "reasonable in light of the statute's text and the overall
statutory scheme .... 539 Finally, the majority invoked Auer super-deference,
citing "formal letter[s]" FWS and NMFS had submitted, which concluded that
EPA transfers of NPDES permit authority were not the kind of discretionary
actions the regulation described. 540 Without identifying an ambiguity in the
regulation, Justice Alito simply declared the agencies' interpretation entitled to
making process arbitrary and capricious.").
530. Id. at 661.
531. Id. at 663-64.
532. Id. at 664-65 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2008)).
533. 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 ("Section 7 [of the ESA] and the requirements of [50 C.F.R. pt. 402] apply
to all actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control."), quoted in Nat'l Ass'n
of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 665.
534. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 665 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
535. See id.
536. Id. at 666 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)).
537. Id.
538. Id.
539. Id.
540. Id. at 672.
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Auer deference. 541
From there, the majority reasoned that because the regulation limited the
scope of ESA section 7 to discretionary federal actions, its language did not
conflict with mandatory statutes, including the Clean Water Act's provisions
requiring the transfer of permit authority once the state meets the nine
enumerated criteria.542  The majority thus avoided reconciling the two
apparently conflicting statutes by narrowly construing the agencies'
interpretive regulation to undercut the mandatory nature of the ESA.
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissenters, recognized that the Court had the
duty to reconcile conflicting statutory mandates if possible.543 He aptly noted
that the majority had failed to do so, instead interpreting the regulation to
restrict the application of section 7(a)(2) only to discretionary actions, thus
excluding mandatory ones.544 Justice Stevens declared that the majority's
interpretation contradicted not only the text and history of the regulation, but
also the ESA, the very statute it purported to interpret.545
The dissent relied heavily on TVA v. Hill,546 better known as the "snail
darter case," 547 in which the Court itself, nearly thirty years earlier, had held
that the language of ESA section 7 could not have been more plain:548 it trumps
all other federal action.549 Justice Stevens concluded that the majority had
erroneously interpreted the wildlife agencies' regulation to "permit[] a
wholesale limitation on the reach of the ESA." 550 Indeed, "both the text of the
ESA and [the Supreme Court's] opinion in Hill compel the contrary
determination that Congress intended the ESA to apply to 'all federal agencies'
and to all 'actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them.' 551
Furthermore, the regulatory history squarely supports the dissenters'
conclusion that the regulation was never intended to limit section 7 to only
discretionary agency actions, but simply to clarify that section 7 reaches both
discretionary and mandatory actions. 55 2 Read in its historical context, the
regulation simply clarified that ESA section 7 applies to all federal agency
actions, whether mandatory or discretionary. 553 Finally, the dissent offered
alternative ways to reconcile the conflicting federal statutes without limiting
541. Id. (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
542. Id. at 665, 673.
543. Id. at 673 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
544. Id. at 674.
545. Id.
546. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
547. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 674.
548. Id. at 677 (quoting Hill, 437 U.S. at 173).
549. Id. at 678 (citing Hill, 437 U.S. at 185).
550. Id. at 679.
551. Id. at 678 (quoting Hill, 437 U.S. at 173).
552. See id. at 680-83.
553. Id. at 679. The dissent correctly noted that this interpretation makes more sense given the
longstanding ambiguity posed by the words "shall" and "may." Id. at 691-92. Indeed, federal
statutes sometimes use the word "shall" in a manner that allows room for discretion. Id. at 691 &
n.12.
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ESA section 7. 554 In fact, the consultation process set out in section 7 itself
provides a method for giving effect to both statutes.
555
In effect, the majority opinion in National Ass'n of Home Builders turned the
Chevron doctrine on its head. By fabricating an ambiguity to bypass Chevron
Step One, Justice Alito ignored the requirement that an agency's authority to
interpret a statute is constrained by the extent of the statutory ambiguity.
556
Further, by construing the regulation to limit the ESA's reach to discretionary
agency actions, the majority essentially eviscerated the mandatory consultation
requirements of the ESA and avoided its judicial responsibility to resolve the
apparent statutory conflict if at all possible. 
557
The majority opinion reveals the fundamental flaw in Chevron: ambiguity is
in the eye of the beholder. 558 In this case, the plain language of section 7(a)(2),
considered in its proper context- the Act of which it is a part-is
unambiguous. 559 Yet the majority invented an ambiguity simply by declaring
that the language of section 7(a)(2) contradicts a host of other mandatory
agency directives. 560 Justice Alito, for the majority, reinterpreted a regulation
adopted thirteen years after the ESA's enactment to strikingly curtail the effect
of section 7(a)(2).561 Yet a direct comparison of the regulation's language with
the statutory provision it purportedly interprets yields the undeniable
conclusion that the statute is unambiguous and thus "beyond the Chevron
pale." 562 Declaring an agency's strained interpretation of an unambiguous
554. Id. at 684-90.
555. Id. at 684-86.
556. See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A.,
517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996).
We accord deference to agencies under Chevron . . . because of a presumption that
Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency,
understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency,
and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion
the ambiguity allows.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984)). Recently, Justice Scalia restated the principle in Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S.
Ct. 2710, 2715 (2009) ("The [agency] can give authoritative meaning to the [ambiguous] statute
within the bounds of that uncertainty.").
557. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 673-74.
558. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 572 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); cf. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 737 (1985) ("Yet plain meaning, like
beauty, is sometimes in the eye of the beholder."). As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
once observed, "[Slome will find ambiguity even in a 'No Smoking' sign . UAW v. Gen.
Dynamics Land Sys. Div., 815 F.2d 1570, 1575 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
559. Indeed, the Court had so held in 1978. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173, 194 (1978).
560. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 666.
561. Id. at 666-69 (relying on 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2009)).
562. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001). The decision also appears
inconsistent with the Court's own precedent in Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-83 (2005). As a postscript, the Departments of Commerce and the Interior
published a final rule on May 4, 2009, withdrawing a December 16, 2008 rule issued by the Bush
Administration, apparently in the wake of Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders. See Bush Rule on
Consultations Withdrawn as Agencies Consider Further Changes, 77 U.S.L.W. 2684, 2684 (May 12, 2009).
The last-minute Bush regulation eased even further federal agencies' consulting obligations under
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statute reasonable, even by a majority of the Supreme Court, does not make it
SO.
E. Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki
In February 2008, the Court decided whether an EEOC complainant had
timely filed a "charge" of age discrimination in Federal Express Corp. v.
Holowecki.563 Holowecki involved a narrow issue of statutory interpretation:
whether an EEOC complainant had timely filed a "charge" at least sixty days
before filing suit. 564 The term "charge" was not defined in the ADEA. 5
65
Although the EEOC had defined the term in various ways, none were
conclusive in this case.566
Holowecki had filed a completed "Intake Questionnaire" with the EEOC
and an affidavit supporting her allegations. 567 Federal Express argued that her
questionnaire did not qualify as a "charge" until the EEOC acted upon it.5
68
The Government argued that the questionnaire could qualify as a charge, but
only if it expressed the filer's intent to have the EEOC take action.56
9
Holowecki took the position that any completed questionnaire qualified as a
"charge" for purposes of tolling the sixty-day waiting period for filing suit.570
A majority of the Court concluded that the contents of the questionnaire
and affidavit, read together, were sufficient to qualify as a "charge" for
purposes of the ADEA. 5 71  In reaching its conclusion, the majority
acknowledged, at least implicitly, that the statutory term "charge" was
ambiguous 572 and that, even with the aid of EEOC regulations, its meaning was
unclear. 573 Under these circumstances, the majority initially invoked Auer,574
deferring to the interpretation suggested by the Government's amicus brief, the
EEOC's Compliance Manual, and internal directives disseminated to field
offices over several years. 575
the ESA. See id. (citing Endangered Species: Interior Finalizes Rule Limiting Consultation on Endangered
Species for Federal Projects, 77 U.S.L.W. 2361 (Dec. 16, 2008)).
563. 128 S. Ct. 1147 (2008) (7-2 opinion).
564. Id. at 1153 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (2006)).
565. Id. at 1152.
566. Id. at 1154.
567. Id.
568. Id.
569. Id.
570. See id.
571. Id. at 1160.
572. See id. at 1154 ("The agency has statutory authority to issue regulations, see [29 U.S.C. § 628
(2006)1; and when an agency invokes its authority to issue regulations, which then interpret
ambiguous statutory terms, the courts defer to its reasonable interpretations.") (citing Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984)).
573. Id.
574. Id. at 1155 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
575. Id.; see also id. at 1159 ("[T]he agency acted within its authority in formulating the rule that a
filing is deemed a charge if the document reasonably can be construed to request agency action and
appropriate relief on the employee's behalf ....").
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Then Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, sidestepped. Observing
that "charge" was a statutory term and not a regulatory one, he acknowledged
that the EEOC regulations had simply "repeat[ed] language from the
underlying statute." 576 Citing Gonzales v. Oregon, the majority conceded that
the agency's informal interpretations of its own regulations therefore were not
entitled to Auer deference. 577 Nevertheless, the majority concluded that the
EEOC's policy statements interpreting both the statute and the regulation
warranted respect "under the less deferential Skidmore standard." 578
Justice Kennedy noted that one Skidmore factor was the consistency of the
agency's interpretation. 579  While the EEOC had been "uneven" in
implementing its policy, the agency's interpretation nevertheless warranted
some deference. 580 The Court evaluated the agency's policy analysis and
concluded that it offered a "reasonable alternative" that was consistent with the
relevant ADEA provisions.581 Because "[n]o clearer alternatives are within [the
Court's] authority or expertise to adopt," the majority held that the EEOC's
interpretation warranted deference under the Skidmore framework. 582 The
Court then applied the agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous
regulations to the facts, concluding that the claimant's completed questionnaire
and accompanying affidavit provided sufficient information to constitute a
"charge." 583
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented. 584 After consulting not one but three
dictionaries, 585 the dissenters declared that a document is not a "charge" if it
"merely describes the alleged discrimination and requests the EEOC's
assistance, but does not objectively manifest an intent to initiate enforcement
proceedings ..."586 In Justice Thomas' view, "charge" is commonly
understood to refer to a request to investigate, which is generally kept
576. Id. at 1156 (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006)).
577. See id. (citing Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 257; Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588
(2000)).
578. Id. (citations omitted).
579. Id.
580. See id.
581. Id. at 1157.
582. Id. Interestingly, the majority went on to conclude, "We find no reason in this case to depart
from our usual rule: Where ambiguities in statutory analysis and application are presented, the
agency may choose among reasonable alternatives." Id. at 1158. The reference to "reasonable
alternatives" suggests once again that the agency's discretion is constrained by the scope of the
statutory ambiguity.
583. Id. at 1159-61.
584. Id. at 1161 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
585. Id. (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICIONARY 312 (4th ed. 2000); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 377 (1993); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 248 (8th ed. 2004)). Justice Scalia
often cites to a veritable library of dictionaries in his textual approach to statutory interpretation.
For a colorful and well-documented history of one oft-cited dictionary, see LYNDA MUGGLESTONE,
LOST FOR WORDS: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2005). Like the
Roberts Court's concept of ambiguity, "the English dictionary was to emerge as a fluid rather than
static construct, with the capacity to change and evolve as circumstances might demand." Id. at 209.
586. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. at 1162 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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confidential from the employer.587 He agreed with the agency that, at
minimum, a "charge" must be in writing and must objectively reflect the
complainant's intent for the EEOC to initiate enforcement. 588 However, Justice
Thomas took issue with the majority's endorsement of a standard that allowed
the agency to define "charge" to mean "whatever the [EEOC] says it is." 589 He
criticized the majority's definition as "broader than the ordinary meaning of the
term 'charge,' and ... so malleable that it effectively absolves the EEOC of its
obligation to administer the ADEA according to discernible standards . 5... 90
Even under the EEOC's interpretation, the dissenters disagreed that the
complainant's questionnaire and affidavit qualified as a "charge." 591 They
asserted that any interpretation construing Holowecki's documents as
exhibiting an intent to initiate enforcement proceedings was "an unreasonable
construction of the statutory term 'charge' and unworthy of deference." 592 The
dissent chastised the majority for its "utterly vague criteria" 593 that would
allow the EEOC to evade the statutory requirement to notify the employer, and
thereby encourage conciliation. 594
Holowecki is notable for invoking each of the deference doctrines, suggesting
that a majority of the Roberts Court may be attempting to integrate its
administrative deference jurisprudence. However, the majority failed to
explicitly recognize and resolve the conflict between Auer and Skidmore, instead
dancing once more on the slippery edge of the "parroting" exception. 595
F. Negusie v. Holder
The Roberts Court revisited its evolving administrative deference
framework in Negusie v. Holder,596 an asylum case invoking the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA). While the case was an appeal from an adjudication
rather than a regulatory challenge, 597 the opinion is worthy of note because it
addressed a claim of ambiguity-by-silence that the Court declined to resolve on
appeal without remanding for specific guidance from the agency.
Negusie, a dual citizen of Ethiopia and Eritrea, 598 sought asylum after
587. Id.
588. Id. (citing Brief for United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 14, Holowecki,
128 S. Ct. 1147 (No. 06-1322), 2007 WL 2808461).
589. Id. at 1161.
590. Id. This language implicitly hints that the majority's interpretation of the statute and the
regulation amounted to a delegation of authority to the EEOC without "intelligible principles,"
contrary to the nondelegation doctrine. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
591. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. at 1163-68.
592. Id. at 1162-63 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-45 (1984)).
593. Id. at 1168.
594. Id.
595. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (recognizing exception to Auer deference
when regulations "parrot" ambiguous statutory terms).
596. 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009).
597. Id. at 1162 (Board of Immigration Appeals decision).
598. Id.
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stowing away to the United States.599 The issue was whether the INA barred
his eligibility for refugee status because he had involuntarily participated in
persecuting Eritrean prisoners.600 The Eritrean government had forced him to
work as a prison guard after imprisoning and beating him for refusing to fight
against Ethiopia. 601 The narrow question was whether Negusie's involuntary
participation in persecution barred him from refugee status under the INA.
60 2
The INA's "persecutor bar" applies to "'any person who ordered, incited,
assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion."' 60 3  Because the statute did not explicitly restrict the
exclusion to voluntary persecutors, the issue was whether its silence on the
precise issue rendered it ambiguous as applied to Negusie. 604
The Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the Fifth Circuit both agreed
with the immigration judge that Negusie could not qualify for refugee status
under the persecutor bar.60 5 In reaching that conclusion, they relied on
Fedorenko v. United States,60 6 a Supreme Court asylum case that had similarly
interpreted an analogous provision of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948.607 On
certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the lower tribunals had misread
Fedorenko to mean that Negusie's motives for his conduct were irrelevant.
60 8
The majority remanded with instructions for the BIA to reconsider the issue
without constraint by Fedorenko.60 9
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the statute's silence
was inconclusive and that congressional intent was otherwise unclear. 610 The
parties disagreed about whether the undisputed fact of coercion was relevant,
and because there was "substance to both contentions," the majority concluded
that "the statute has an ambiguity that the agency should address in the first
instance."611 The case was remanded to allow the BIA to consider the question
anew in light of the Court's holding that Fedorenko did not control the
outcome. 612
While concluding that the INA was ambiguous by omission, the majority
failed to apply "traditional tools of statutory interpretation" to resolve the
599. Id. at 1163.
600. Id.
601. Id. at 1162.
602. Id. at 1164.
603. Id. at 1162 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006)). The language is known in immigration
law as the "persecutor bar." Id.
604. See id.
605. Id. at 1163.
606. 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
607. See Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1165 (citing Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 495).
608. Id. at 1163.
609. Id. at 1167.
610. Id. at 1164.
611. Id. (emphasis added).
612. Id. at 1166-67 ("The BIA deemed its interpretation to be mandated by Fedorenko, and that
error prevented it from a full consideration of the statutory question here presented.").
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ambiguity on its own.613 The majority rationalized its reluctance to interpret
the statute without the benefit of the BIA's reasoning, reasserting the Chevron
fiction that "'ambiguities in statutes within an agency's jurisdiction to
administer are delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in
reasonable fashion." 614
Justice Thomas dissented,615 interpreting the INA to "unambiguously
preclude[] any inquiry into whether the persecutor acted voluntarily ..."616
Reiterating the Chevron doctrine, Justice Thomas noted that if the statute's plain
language resolves the issue, both the agency and the reviewing court must
follow Congress' expressed intent. 617 He concluded that both the specific
statutory language and the INA as a whole demonstrated that the persecutor
bar applied to Negusie, whether or not his conduct had been coerced. 618
Justice Thomas rightly chastised the majority to the extent that it declined
to apply Chevron Step One, which requires the reviewing court to apply the tools
of statutory construction in an effort to resolve a statutory ambiguity. 619 As
Thomas cautioned, "[T]he Court should not, 'in the name of deference, abdicate
its responsibility to interpret a statute' simply because it requires some
effort." 620 He reasoned that by omitting the qualifying term "voluntary" from
the persecutor bar, Congress must not have intended to restrict the nature of the
persecution that would bar an asylum applicant from the benefits of refugee
status. 621
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in part and dissented in
part.622 Like Justice Thomas, they disagreed with the majority's decision to
remand without first interpreting the statutory language, which they too
considered unambiguous. 623 Quoting his own words from Chevron, Justice
Stevens emphasized that "[tlhe judiciary is the final authority on issues of
statutory construction." 624 Unlike Justice Thomas, however, Justices Stevens
613. See id. at 1172 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But see Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
614. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1167 (2009) (quoting Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 867, 980 (2005)). In further support, the majority cited Gonzales v.
Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006) (per curiam), in which the Court had summarily reversed a Ninth Circuit
decision holding that a family qualified as a protected social group for purposes of claiming refugee
status. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1167 (citing Thomas, 547 U.S. at 186). Thomas held that the case should
have been remanded for the agency to apply the law to the facts. Thomas, 547 U.S. at 187.
615. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1176 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
616. Id.
617. Id. at 1178 (citing Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 664, 665
(2007)).
618. See id. at 1179.
619. Id. at 1183.
620. Id. at 1183 (quoting Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecomms., Inc., 550
U.S. 45, 77 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
621. Id. at 1184-85.
622. Id. at 1170 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
623. Id. at 1173 ("[Tihe threshold question the Court addresses today is a 'pure question of
statutory construction for the courts to decide.'") (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
446 (1987)).
624. Id. at 1171 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,843
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and Breyer would have held that the persecutor bar does not apply to
involuntary persecutors. 625
Negusie illustrates the starkly different approaches the justices continue to
take when addressing issues of statutory interpretation and agency deference.
One thing is clear: the Court remains seriously divided on how to apply
Chevron. As the dissenting opinions suggested, the majority erroneously
conflated the Chevron framework in a manner that leap-frogged the Court's
threshold responsibility to interpret the statute in the first instance. As the APA
plainly requires, the reviewing court is to decide all issues of law, including the
meaning of disputed statutory language. 626
G. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council
One of the last cases the Court decided in its 2008 Term offered a clear
opportunity to resolve the conflict between Auer super-deference and Skidmore
sliding-scale deference, as reinvigorated by Mead. The Court not only declined
to do so, but also further obscured the distinctions among the common law
deference regimes it has articulated and applied over the last decade.
In Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council,627 the Court
once again addressed the Clean Water Act and regulations adopted by the EPA
and the Corps. The question was whether Coeur Alaska could lawfully carry
out its plan to discharge slurry and other waste from a proposed "froth-
flotation" gold mine into a small lake in a national forest, which all parties
agreed met the statutory definition of "navigable water." 628
Section 306 of the Clean Water Act imposes stringent effluent limitations on
new point sources of water pollution. The statute also charges the EPA with
issuing regulations establishing mandatory "performance standards." 629 The
Act plainly prohibits any discharge in violation of the EPA's performance
standards. 630 In compliance with the Act's directives, the EPA issued a
performance standard for new mining facilities, including gold mines using the
"froth-flotation" process. 631 The standard flatly prohibits new mines from
discharging wastewater into navigable waters. 632
In apparent conflict with the EPA's mandatory authority to regulate new
point sources are two other sections of the Act that give discretionary permit
authority to the EPA and the Corps, respectively, to regulate certain kinds of
discharges. 633 In general, the EPA "may" issue permits for pollutants under
n.9 (1984)).
625. See id. at 1176.
626. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
627. 129 S. Ct. 2458 (2009) (6-3 opinion).
628. Id. at 2464.
629. See 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2006).
630. Id. § 1316(e).
631. 40 C.F.R. § 440.104(b)(1) (2008).
632. Id.
633. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2006) (EPA); id. § 1344(a) (Corps).
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section 402 "[e]xcept as provided" in section 404, which grants similar authority
to the Corps for "fill material. " 634 All parties agreed that Coeur Alaska's slurry
and wastewater are regulated pollutants and also qualify as "fill material"
under jointly-issued regulations. 635
Several environmental groups filed suit challenging the Corps' permit,
issued after consultation with the EPA, that allowed Coeur Alaska to discharge
slurry and other mining waste into the lake under specified conditions,
including reclamation plans for the lake after mining ceased.636 The Court
upheld the permit in a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Kennedy. 637 Justices
Stevens and Souter joined Justice Ginsburg's opinion in dissent. 638
Considered in its entirety, the majority opinion demonstrates the Court's
tendency to find statutes or regulations ambiguous, thus justifying its apparent
enthusiasm for deferring to agency interpretations. Initially, Justice Kennedy
dodged the question of whether the statutes granting discretionary permit
authority are ambiguous for lack of clarity about whether each agency's permit
authority is mutually exclusive. 639 Deferring to the agencies' resolution of the
issue, the majority declared that if the Corps has discretionary authority to issue
permits for discharge of fill material, then the EPA is "forbid[den]" from doing
so.
640
Having decided that the Corps' discretionary authority to regulate fill
material trumps the EPA's discretionary authority to regulate pollutants
(including fill material), 641 the majority next turned to the more important
issue. The overarching question was whether the Corps had lawfully issued a
discharge permit to Coeur Alaska that would undoubtedly result in the
discharge of slurry and wastewater into navigable waters, contrary to the EPA's
new source performance standards. This time, the majority declared that the
Clean Water Act does not directly speak to the "'precise question'" because it
allows the Corps to issue permits regulating fill material.
642
Next, the majority concluded that the Act was ambiguous as to whether the
634. Id. § 1344(a).
635. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2468 (2009) (citing 40
C.F.R. § 232.2 (2008)).
636. Id. at 2465-66.
637. Id. at 2463.
638. Id. at 2480 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
639. See id. at 2467 (majority opinion). Justice Kennedy first concluded that the Act was "best
understood" to provide that if the Corps has discretionary authority to issue a permit, the EPA does
not. Id. "Even if there were ambiguity on this point, the EPA's own regulations would resolve it."
Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.3 (2008)). Furthermore, by avoiding a conclusion that the statutes are
unambiguous, the majority stopped short of foreclosing agency discretion to interpret the statutes
differently in the future. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 982-83 (2005); see also supra notes 397-418 and accompanying text. Instead, the majority simply
assumed, without deciding, that the joint regulation reasonably resolved the apparent overlap in
permit authority. By failing to decide the threshold question of ambiguity, the majority effectively
delegated the interpretive issue to the agencies.
640. Coeur Alaska, 129 S. Ct. at 2468.
641. Id. at 2469.
642. Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)).
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EPA's new source performance standards apply to fill material at all, again
because it grants "blanket authority" to the Corps to permit discharges of fill
material. 643 This reasoning, however, erroneously elevates the Corps' narrow
discretionary authority to issue permits for fill material to override the Act's
plain language that prohibits effluent discharges in violation of the EPA's new
source performance standards.
Nevertheless, the majority declared the regulations inconclusive about
whether the new source performance standards apply to fill material. 644 That
determination led the majority to an internal EPA memorandum concluding
that its "'regulatory regime[,] ... including effluent limitations guidelines and
standards, such as those applicable to gold ore mining.., do not apply" to
Coeur Alaska's proposed discharge. 645 From this informal interpretation, the
majority, using at best strained reasoning, concluded that if a discharge of fill
material permitted by the Corps does not require an EPA permit, then the EPA's
performance standards do not apply either.646
The majority's consideration of the EPA's internal memorandum squarely
presented the Court, once again, with the conflict between Auer and
Mead/Skidmore. On the one hand, Auer would confer super-deference to the
agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations, even in the form of a
litigation position or some other informal policy statement. 647 On the other,
Mead provides that informal agency interpretations such as memoranda merit
Skidmore deference at most, and then only to the extent the reviewing court
finds them persuasive. 648
Regrettably, neither the majority nor the dissent recognized and resolved
the conflict. However, Justice Scalia implicitly acknowledged the
irreconcilability in his concurring opinion.649  After first excoriating the
majority for failing to apply Chevron to the EPA's internal memorandum, he
went on to criticize the majority for applying Auer. As he noted, the ambiguity
was not limited to the agency's own regulations; rather, it also involved their
conformity to the governing statute itself, which Scalia deemed ambiguous as
well.650 In that sense, Auer was not controlling, and Justice Scalia thought the
majority should have applied Chevron instead. 651 In the end, however, he
concurred in the result, noting his "pleasure" in joining an opinion that
"effectively ignore[d]" Mead altogether. 652
643. Id. at 2471-72.
644. Id. at 2472-73.
645. Id. at 2473 (quoting Memorandum from Diane Regas, Director, EPA Office of Wetlands,
Oceans and Watersheds, to Randy Smith, Director, EPA Office of Water 3 (May 17, 2004), available at
http://www.vnf.com/assets/attachments/EPAs_2004_RegasMemo.pdf).
646. See id. Words fail.
647. See supra notes 256-81 and accompanying text (discussing Auer).
648. See supra notes 315-35 and accompanying text (discussing Mead).
649. Coeur Alaska, 129 S. Ct. at 2479-80 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
650. Id. at 2479.
651. Id.
652. Id. at 2480.
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Not surprisingly, Justice Ginsburg's dissent concluded that the majority's
reasoning "strain[ed] credulity." 653 She read the Act to plainly prohibit effluent
discharges in violation of the EPA's new source performance standards. 654
Therefore, if a new source discharge were to be authorized at all, the EPA was
the appropriate agency to do so, as Congress had delegated it primary authority
to issue effluent permits. 655 Justice Ginsburg convincingly reconciled the Act's
overlapping permissive agency authority with its mandatory effluent
limitations on new source discharges. She concluded that if fill material
otherwise qualified for a Corps permit but would violate the EPA's new source
performance standards, then the proposed discharge of slurry and
wastewater-if permitted at all-it should be regulated by the EPA, not the
Corps.656
H. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n
On the final day of its October 2008 Term, the Roberts Court issued Cuomo
v. Clearing House Ass'n.657 The opinion demonstrates the difficulty of achieving
consensus in the deference arena, even on the threshold question of whether a
statutory term is ambiguous, let alone which deference framework applies.
The New York Attorney General sought to enforce state lending laws
against national banks. In that process, he requested information from several
national banks in lieu of issuing subpoenas.658 The United States Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and a trade group sought injunctive relief,
relying on an OCC regulation 659 that interpreted a provision of the National
Bank Act. 660 Adopted in a notice-and-comment proceeding, the regulation
generally bars state officials from "exercis[ing] visitorial powers with respect to
national banks," including requiring the banks to produce records or
"prosecuting enforcement actions." 661 The petitioners argued that the OCC
regulation preempted New York's effort to enforce its fair-lending laws against
national banks.662
Surprisingly, this time Justice Scalia's majority opinion was joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.663 At the outset, Justice Scalia
conceded "some ambiguity" with respect to "visitorial powers" because the
term's boundaries are unclear. 664 The OCC admittedly had authority to
653. Id. at 2483 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
654. Id. at 2482.
655. See id. at 2482-83.
656. Id. at 2483.
657. 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
658. Id. at 2716, 2721.
659. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(1) (2009).
660. 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2006).
661. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(1), quoted in Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2715.
662. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2714.
663. Id.
664. Id. at 2715.
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interpret the statute to the extent of its ambiguity, subject to the "outer limits of
the term" as determined by the Court.665
After reviewing sovereigns' historical use of "visitorial powers" to oversee
corporate operations, 666 the majority held that the term, in its modern sense,
narrowly refers to administrative oversight, excluding enforcement of state
statutes of general applicability. 667 The majority concluded that the regulation,
properly interpreted, did not bar New York from enforcing state law against
national banks. 668  To the extent the OCC had expansively interpreted
"visitorial powers" to preclude states from filing state-law enforcement suits
against national banks, its interpretation was not a reasonable one. 669
Justice Thomas dissented in part, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Kennedy and Alito. 670 Unlike the majority, the dissenters considered
the term "visitorial powers" ambiguous, so they would have deferred to the
OCC regulation as a reasonable interpretation.6 71
All justices agreed that Chevron was the appropriate framework, but they
differed on how to apply Step One-whether an undefined statutory term is
ambiguous. In dissent, Justice Thomas reasoned that the term "visitorial
powers" was indeed ambiguous because it was "susceptible to more than one
meaning." 672 Next, he consulted nineteenth century dictionaries that disclosed
a "broad dictionary definition" of the term, concluding that the OCC regulation
was reasonable because it was well within the bounds of that definition. 673
V. CONCLUSION
On the final day of the 2008 Term, the Roberts Court once again split 5-4 in
a case in which all nine justices agreed that Chevron was the applicable deference
framework.674 At twenty-five years of age, Chevron continues to confound the
Court in its application. No longer can Justice Scalia rationally endorse Chevron
as a predictable rule of judicial deference "against which Congress can
legislate." 675
Only once did any of the Court's four separate opinions in the recent case
of Negusie v. Holder cite the controlling statute: APA section 10.676 Justice
Stevens alone acknowledged the controlling rule of law in a footnote to his
665. Id.
666. Id. at 2715-17.
667. See id. at 2718, 2721.
668. Id. at 2718-19.
669. See id. at 2721.
670. Id. at 2722 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
671. See id. at 2723-24.
672. See id. at 2723.
673. Id. at 2727 ("Put simply, OCC selected a permissible construction of a statutory term that
was susceptible to multiple interpretations.").
674. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n,, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
675. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE L.J.
511, 517 (1989); see also Chevron Symposium, supra note 281.
676. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (codifying APA § 10).
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dissenting opinion: "The [APA provides] that courts 'shall decide all relevant
questions of law [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provisions' but
shall review 'agency action, findings, and conclusions' under the arbitrary and
capricious/abuse of- discretion standard."6 77 Unlike the Supreme Court's
common law deference doctrines, 678 the language of the APA, at least with
respect to issues of law, is plain and unambiguous. In reviewing agency
actions, including legislative rules, interpretive regulations, and adjudicatory
rulings, it is for the courts to decide relevant questions of law, including the
meaning of ambiguous statutes and regulations. 679 And it is for agencies to
decide how to apply the law, as interpreted by the courts, to the facts and
circumstances of a particular case.680
While continuing to cite Chevron and pretending to apply it as a distinct
deference framework, the Court appears to have delegated away to agencies its
own statutory responsibility to "decide all relevant questions of law." 681 After
twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has become immersed in the immensely
complicated thicket of Chevron and its progeny, with no clear resolution in
sight. The venerable and much-loved doctrine is simply unworkable because
the courts have been unable to apply it in a consistent, predictable way. 682
A. Reconciling and Unifying Deference Jurisprudence
The various common law deference regimes can and should be reconciled
and merged into a unified, integrated deference framework. It makes no sense
for the Court to engage in elaborate judicial debates over whether Chevron
deference, Auer deference, Skidmore deference, or some other common law
regime applies.683 In fact, the Chevron Court would have reached precisely the
677. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1172 n.3 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 706).
678. Even Justice Scalia recently conceded that the Court's deference doctrine has become
muddled, although he simplistically attributes the blame to Mead. See Coeur
Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2479-89 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
679. As the Court's deference regimes acknowledge, there may be a range of permissible
interpretations within the boundaries of an agency's delegation of authority. Under that
circumstance, however, it remains the reviewing court's responsibility to determine the statutory
boundaries that constrain the agency's interpretive discretion.
680. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
681. See id. When Congress delegates lawmaking authority to an agency and then delegates to
the courts the power to review agency lawmaking, separation of lawmaking and judicial powers is
presumably preserved. But when the courts in turn delegate to the agency the power to interpret
the agency's own legislative rules, then both lawmaking and judicial review authority repose in the
same administrative agency Congress has charged with enforcing those laws. Thus, the outcome of
the Court's administrative deference doctrine raises troubling separation of powers issues. See
supra note 84 and accompanying text.
682. See, e.g., Coeur Alaska, 129 S. Ct. at 2479 & n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (citing conflicting federal circuit decisions).
683. In Coeur Alaska, Justice Scalia insisted, "If we must not call that practice Chevron deference,
then we have to rechristen the rose." Id. at 2479. To the contrary, debating how best to "rechristen
the rose" begs the question of whether the agency's interpretation is due any deference. That
determination requires the Court to carry out its institutional and statutory responsibility to
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same result had it applied traditional Skidmore multi-factor deference. The
Court would have deferred to the EPA's "bubble" definition of "point source"
because the factors in that case were highly persuasive according to Skidmore's
sliding scale of deference. 684
As Justice Stevens has recently reminded us,
Judicial deference to agencies' views on statutes they administer was not born
in [Chevron], nor did the "singularly judicial role of marking the boundaries
of agency choice," die with that case. In the years before Chevron, this Court
recognized that statutory interpretation is a multifaceted enterprise, ranging
from a precise construction of statutory language to a determination of what
policy best effectuates statutory objectives. We accordingly acknowledged
that a complete interpretation of a statutory provision might demand both
judicial construction and administrative explication. 685
The Roberts Court occasionally appears to be striving to devise a deference
framework that merges Chevron, Auer, and Mead-certainly a laudable goal. 686
However, federal agencies and reviewing courts need clear guidance now. And
after four years, the Roberts Court has demonstrated its inability to reach a
consensus.
B. Reviving Congress
It is time for Congress to step in. To its credit, the House Judiciary
Committee has embarked on a multi-year bipartisan study known as the
Administrative Law, Process and Procedure Project for the 21st Century. 687
One of its purposes is to make a case to Congress for reinstating the
Administrative Conference of the United States.688
1. Revising the APA to Clarify Judicial Review of Agency Actions
As part of that project, Congress should enact comprehensive revisions to
the APA and clearly set forth what circumstances trigger deference by the
courts and what conditions constrain judicial deference to agency
interpretations of law. Until it does, the Court will continue to assume that
interpret the law in the first instance, rather than argue internally about how to "christen" various
common law deference doctrines of the Court's own making.
684. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
685. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159,1170-71 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Young v.
Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 988 (1986)).
686. See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147,1156 (2008).
687. SUBCOMM. ON COMMERCIAL & ADMIN. LAW, H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 109,m CONG.,
INTERIM REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PROCESS AND PROCEDURE PROJECT FOR THE 21sr
CENTURY 1 (Comm. Print 2007), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/about/pdf/31505.pdf (last
visited Feb. 14, 2010).
688. Id.; see supra notes 167-70 (discussing efforts to reestablish Administrative
Conference).
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Congress has acquiesced in its haphazard application of common law deference
doctrines, notwithstanding the clear language of the APA that directs the courts
to decide all questions of law. 689
As we have seen, APA section 10, for all practical purposes, is a dead
letter.690 Courts have devised common law deference frameworks that have
little or no relationship to the APA's provisions dictating the scope of judicial
review of agency interpretations of law. Once Congress legislates anew, the
courts will have no choice but to begin with the statute's deference framework
rather than continuing to rely primarily, if not exclusively, on convoluted
common law deference regimes that predate the APA. After all, the underlying
theory of all deference regimes is that Congress intended to delegate
policymaking authority to the executive branch. Thus, Congress must accept-
and execute -its responsibility for clarifying the applicable standard of judicial
review when a litigant challenges an agency's exercise of its congressionally
delegated authority.
2. Reestablishing the Administrative Conference
Congress should also breathe new life into the Administrative Conference
of the United States to address the difficult and complex issues of judicial
review and separation of powers. 691 The reconstituted Conference should
operate in a manner similar to the Judicial Conference of the United States, but
with a focus on administrative law. By bringing together representatives of the
bench, the bar, the academic community, and Congress, the Conference is
fundamentally necessary to provide a focal point for resolving the delicate
balance about which Justice Kennedy wrote in Gonzales v. Oregon.
692
C. Articulating a Reasoned Framework for Determining Ambiguity
The threshold determination of ambiguity remains the most troubling
aspect of the Court's deference jurisprudence. The seemingly endless and
unduly heated debate among the justices about which deference regime applies
begs the question. The appropriate scope of deference is simply irrelevant
689. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
690. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently sought to preserve judicial review
under 5 U.S.C. § 706 by reasoning, "Even when an agency's construction of its statute passes muster
,under Chevron, a party may claim that the disputed agency action is 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Eagle Broad. Group, Ltd. v. FCC, 563 F.3d
543, 551 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). It remains unclear whether the Court's
common law deference regimes entirely displace § 706, or whether it serves as a stop-gap standard
even if an agency's interpretation passes muster under whatever common law deference framework
the Court sees fit to apply.
691. On March 3, 2010, just before this article went to press, the Senate confirmed presidential
nominee Paul Verkuil to direct the reestablished Administrative Conference of the United States.
See supra note 170.
692. 546 U.S. 243, 255 (2005) ("[B]alancing the necessary respect for an agency's knowledge,
expertise, and constitutional office with the courts' role as interpreter of laws can be a delicate
matter....").
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unless the Court first determines, as a matter of law, that a statute is ambiguous
after applying traditional tools of statutory construction. Only then is it
appropriate to consider the agency's interpretation, and only then should the
Court address the degree of deference due, if any.
The Rehnquist Court's decision in Brand X has underscored the overarching
nature of the threshold question, which must be resolved before deciding the
appropriate standard of review. For if the reviewing court determines that a
statute is unambiguous, Brand X teaches that the judicial interpretation is
binding on agencies that have already reached - or may subsequently reach - a
different conclusion.
Yet the Supreme Court has never adopted a disciplined framework for
deciding whether a statute-or an agency regulation, for that matter-is
sufficiently ambiguous to warrant deference to the agency to resolve the
ambiguity within permissible statutory boundaries. Lacking such a framework,
the Court all too often ducks its responsibility to resolve ambiguities and
instead becomes embroiled in bitter ancillary debates about which deference
doctrine applies. Moreover, the Court's inclination to dodge the resolution of
legal issues by declaring ambiguity sets up a poor incentive for Congress and
agencies alike to draft statutes and legislative rules with clarity.
If one factor explains the degree of deference (or lack of deference) courts
ultimately pay agency interpretations of law, it is the outcome of the threshold
determination of ambiguity, inherently a judicial function. Legislative
ambiguities will always be with us as an inherent aspect of reaching political
compromise. Under any of the Court's modern deference doctrines -Chevron,
Auer, Mead, or Gonzales - the extent to which a reviewing court takes initiative
to resolve an apparent ambiguity using traditional tools of statutory
construction ultimately determines the degree of deference it will likely accord
an agency's interpretation rather than its own.
Just what traditional tools of statutory construction the federal courts
should consistently apply to decide whether a rule or statute is ambiguous is a
topic that warrants further research and scholarly debate. More often than not,
a shifting majority of the Roberts Court appears to cherry-pick among them to
reach its desired result, which all too often punts the interpretive ball back to
the executive branch.
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